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Abstract 
 In my thesis, I assess whether the Supreme Court can impact the actions 
and policies of regulatory agencies. Specifically, I review the impact that the 
Burger Court, the Court under Chief Justice Warren Burger, had on regulatory 
agencies as they deregulated banking policies. I provide three case studies dealing 
with different deregulatory banking trends that occurred during the Burger Court: 
the raising of interest rate caps on bank loans, the geographic expansion of 
banking, and the repeal of Glass-Steagall. For each case, I conduct an in-depth 
analysis on a survey of Burger Court decisions dealing with the deregulatory 
trend. Following, I trace the impact of these cases through subsequent agency 
actions. Through each case study, I find that the Supreme Court provided agencies 
with deregulatory goals with “regulatory tools” that allowed them to deregulate 
the banking industry. Similarly, the Supreme Court provided agencies with pro-
regulatory goals with “regulatory roadblocks” that hindered their ability to 
maintain strict regulations over banks. Over time, this allowed the Burger Court to 
drive banking regulation towards deregulation.  
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Introduction 
 Regulatory agencies are tasked with enforcing statutes that are created and passed by the 
legislature. Federal regulatory agencies enforce statutes passed by Congress and state regulatory 
agencies enforce statutes passed by their state legislature. Agencies do this in a number of ways. 
For one, they interpret legislation and turn statutes into specific rules that govern their regulatory 
population.1 Statutes will often guide regulators on how to turn their statutes into rules, but 
regulators are often given broad discretion in their rule making and enforcement of these laws. 
This broad discretion gives agencies the ability to react to unforeseen developments in their 
regulatory work.2 For example, regulatory agencies write rules in response to changes in the 
industry they regulate in order to update their rules to the new conditions. Though agencies are 
given broad discretion, they cannot stray too far from the intent and words of the statutes they are 
given because their rule making is subject to judicial review. 3 If an agency disregards or ignores 
the language or intent of the statutes handed down to it, its rules can be challenged in court and 
the agency may have to amend or repeal its rules. 
 In addition to rule making, regulatory agencies are tasked with rule enforcement. When 
actors within an industry are not complying with the rules put forward by regulatory agencies, 
agencies can respond with a variety of actions. In many instances, agencies will take legal action 
against non-compliant actors within their industry. For example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission can file a criminal suit against an investment-banker suspected of insider trading. 																																																								
1 By regulatory population, I refer to the actors that the agencies oversee through their regulation. 
See Cannon, B.C., & Johnson, C.A. (1999). “Implementing Population” Judicial Policies. 
Implementation and Impact  (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press 
2 Seidenfeld, M. (2009).Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of 
Judicial Review.” Ohio State Law Journal, 70, no. 2, 251 
3 Jerry L. Mashaw (1994), Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on 
Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 185, 200–04, 229–
30  
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Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission can file a civil suit against a company engaged in 
monopolistic practices. This rule enforcement work allows regulatory agencies to show their 
regulatory population that they will be punished if they do not comply with their rules. Ideally, 
this will drive up the perceived cost of noncompliance to other firms within the industry, and 
thus, dissuade noncompliance. Because rule enforcement can be dependent on the judicial 
system, regulators must take into account whether their rules and actions have standing with the 
courts.4 
 Through rule making and rule enforcing, regulatory agencies play an important role in the 
United States democracy. They serve as an implementing population by ensuring that the laws 
established by elected officials are actually employed in practice.5 Legislatures rely on 
government agencies to ensure the laws they pass actually have an impact on their constituents. 
If a regulatory agency decides not to align its rules with statutory law, statutes will have little 
practical effect. Similarly, if a regulatory agency decides not to enforce its rules, statutes will 
also have no effect. Further, the way in which the agencies interpret statutes influences how 
those statutes are carried out and enforced. The importance of regulatory agencies to American 
democracy makes studying the forces that influence agency decisions important to political 
science. Knowing what forces impact regulators allows observers to predict how changes in 
various legal, political, and cultural factors will influence regulatory policy.  
While many studies have analyzed various influences of regulatory policy, I focus my 
research on how the Supreme Court can influence regulatory agencies. I test how the Supreme 
Court impacts regulatory policy by analyzing the impact the Burger Court had on banking 																																																								
4 Seidenfeld, M. (2009).Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of 
Judicial Review.” Ohio State Law Journal, 70, no. 2, 252 
5 Canon, B.C., & Johnson, C.A. (1999). “Implementing Population” Judicial Policies. 
Implementation and Impact  (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press	
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regulation. As can be seen through Figure 1, the Burger Court’s banking decisions marked a 
clear reversal of the previous Court’s (the Warren Court) ideological preferences towards 
securities regulation. “The “Burger Court” refers to the Supreme Court under Chief Justice 
Warren Burger. This was the Supreme Court from 1969-1986. The “Warren Court” refers to the 
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren. This was the Supreme Court from 1953-1969. 
This change coincided with a noticeable wave of deregulatory actions by banking regulatory 
agencies. This correlation prompted me to further investigate what role the Supreme Court 
played in this deregulation.	 
Through my analysis, I found that the Supreme Court was able to influence the direction 
of regulatory policy. Through determining this causal impact, I develop a new theory of the 
judicial-agency relationship. I argue that the Court can impact government agencies and their 
regulatory policies by providing “regulatory tools” to agencies whose goals align with Supreme 
Court decisions. Similarly, I contend the Supreme Court can create “regulatory roadblocks” that 
inhibit regulators with goals opposing the Supreme Court’s decisions. Because agencies have 
limited resources, agencies with goals that have many roadblocks attached to them will focus 
their resources on other goals. Similarly, agencies with tools to get around the roadblocks that 
block a major goal will focus their resources on that goal. In this manner, the Supreme Court 
helped decide which government agency goals were achieved and which government agency 
goals were not achieved. In the context of banking deregulation, the Supreme Court limited 
agencies with pro-regulatory goals and aided agencies with deregulatory goals.   
  I begin the thesis, in Section 1, by reviewing the relationship of government agencies 
and the Supreme Court. In this section, I discuss previous theories on the judicial-agency 
relationship. Following, I describe my own theory and explain how I tested it through my 
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research. In Section 2, I examine the relevant actors that played a role in the deregulation of the 
banking industry. I outline the economic and banking conditions of the time period. Next, I 
review the history of the Burger Court and the relevant banking regulatory agencies. In Section 
3, 4, and 5, I dive into three "deregulatory trends" that I use as case studies for the Burger Court's 
impact on banking regulation. I assess the Supreme Court's impact on the deregulation of interest 
rate caps on bank loans, restrictions on geographic bank expansion, and the repeal of Glass-
Steagall. After reviewing each of these case studies, I summarize my conclusions and 
hypothesize what these findings imply for the future of our understanding of the judicial-agency 
relationship.  
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Figure 1: Warren Court Securities and Consumer Protection Laws Cases (left) vs. Burger 
Court Securities and Consumer Protection Laws Cases 
 
	
		
 
Washington University Law School, The Supreme Court Database, Cases selected: Warren Court 
and Burger Court; judgments of the Court, opinions of the court, and per curiam (orally argued); 
federal or state regulation of securities (http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php) 	
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Part 1: Inter-Branch Background 
 In this section, I provide a comprehensive review of the existing literature analyzing the 
relationship between the Supreme Court and government agencies. I discuss what motivates 
agencies to act and what causes agencies to respond to the Supreme Court. Throughout my 
review of past literature, I show how my research fits in and complements previous studies. 
Finally, I end this section by offering my own inter-branch framework, which I term the 
regulatory tool and roadblock framework, and I explain how I prove this theory through my 
thesis.  
A. The Supreme Court and Regulatory Agencies 
I. What Causes Agencies to Act? 
 In order to understand the relationship between the Supreme Court and government 
agencies, it is important to understand what causes agencies to act. Determining what causes 
agencies to act involves looking at the motivations of agencies and the individuals who make 
agencies up. In James Perry and Lois Wise’s article, The Motivation Bases of Public Service, the 
authors name three important motivations of the individuals who work for regulatory agencies.6 
Perry’s first motivation is the rational motive.7 Perry and Wise note that each individual actor is 
driven by his or her utility maximization. Taking action that maximizes his or her own utility 
motivates a civil servant. In financial regulation, the idea of the “revolving door” plays an 
important role in this motivation. Often times a regulator’s ultimate goal is to work for one of the 
firms he or she is regulating, and this impedes that regulator’s ability to establish tough rules or 
																																																								
6 Perry, J.L., Wise, L.R. (1990). The Motivational Bases of Public Service. Public Administrative 
Review, 50, No. 3, 367-373. 
7 ibid, at 368. 
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enforce tough regulations.8 Thus, a public servant may be rationally motivated to cater to the 
interests of the actors he or she is supposed to regulate.  
 Perry and Wise also argue that civil servants are motivated by the social importance of 
their work and their desire to serve the public interest.9 According to this motivation, a regulator 
will be motivated to enact a certain policy because of his or her genuine belief that this policy is 
beneficial to the public. Though this motivation is less self-interested than the rational 
motivation, it is still subject to the ideological biases of individual regulators. Regulators with 
differing ideological backgrounds will have different views on which courses of actions are 
socially important and beneficial to society. Thus, shifts in the ideological breakdown of an 
agency can have a significant impact on the actions that agency takes.  
 Another important way to think about regulatory action is by analyzing the process by 
which agencies, as a whole, decide to take action. Mark Seidenfeld has developed the “purposive 
process” to explain how agencies set their agenda.10 Seidenfeld explains that an agency begins 
the process of agenda-setting by laying out its goals. Each agency has many goals, and these 
goals are derived from the mission of an agency, pressure from law makers, and the ideological 
preferences of the agency’s leadership.11 After laying out the agency's goals, an agency will 
identify the significant roadblocks that stand in the way of the agency achieving its goals. For 
example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) might lay out its goal to increase the use 
of renewable energy over fossil fuels in the United States. Then, the EPA would note that this 
																																																								
8 Wilmarth, Arthur E. “Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street.” 
University of Cincinnati Law Review, col. 81, 18 Sept. 2013, pp. 1287. LexisNexis Academic. 
9 Perry, J.L., Wise, L.R. (1990). The Motivation Bases of Public Service. Public Administrative 
Review, 50, No. 3, 368. 
10 Seidenfeld, M. (2009).Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of 
Judicial Review.” Ohio State Law Journal, 70, no. 2, 252-321 
11 ibid, at 261 
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goal is currently roadblocked by the high prices of renewable energy sources. After laying out 
roadblocks standing in the way of major goals, an agency will evaluate the potential solutions 
that will allow an agency to overcome a roadblock and accomplish their goals. These solutions 
can come internally from agency staff, or can be derived from an outside force such as a 
lobbyist, Congress, or the Courts. Because of time and resource constraints, an agency will focus 
on major goals that have limited roadblocks with easily discernible solutions.12  
II. What Causes Agencies to Respond to the Court? 
If both individual motivations and the purposive method cause agencies to act, the 
question remains why these forces would cause agencies to respond to the Supreme Court. James 
Spriggs sought to measure what influenced agencies to comply with Supreme Court decisions. 
Spriggs’ analyzes a series of Supreme Court cases where the Court reversed or remanded an 
agency action.13 Spriggs found that agency compliance with the Supreme Court in these cases 
depended on factors such as the specificity of the opinions, the ideological preferences of the 
agency, the age of the agency, and the amicus curiae support of the case.14 Overall, Spriggs 
theorizes that these factors influence agencies because agencies are likely to comply when the 
cost of noncompliance is high. While Spriggs theorizes what causes agencies to comply with the 
Supreme Court, Canon and Johnson seek to understand what causes actors to not comply with 
the Court.15 Canon and Johnson offer reasons why government agencies do not implement 
Supreme Court decisions. Canon and Johnson note that agencies often do not want to comply 
																																																								12	ibid, at 262.	
13 Spriggs, J.F. (1996). The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A Resource-
Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact. American Jounral of Political Science, 40, 4th 
ser., 1122-1151  
14 ibid 
15 Canon, B.C., & Johnson, C.A. (1999). “Implementing Population.” Judicial Policies. 
Implementation and Impact  (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press  
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with the Supreme Court because it could hamper their career aspirations. It is easy to see how the 
rational motive, discussed by Perry and Wise, can cause an individual regulator to not wish to 
comply with the Court if that regulator believes implementation will impede his or her career 
success. A bank examiner for the Federal Reserve who wishes to one day work for a bank may 
not want to report that bank’s noncompliance with a Supreme Court decision. Further, the social 
importance motivation discussed by Perry and Wise can cause a regulator to not comply with the 
Supreme Court when a regulator is ideologically opposed to the decision.  
Though Spriggs’ and Canon and Johnson’s studies were enlightening, their results do not 
measure all Supreme Court responses to court cases. Spriggs only measures agencies’ response 
to the Supreme Court in terms of agencies’ compliance. Further, Canon and Johnson measure the 
court’s impact through agency's implementations of its rulings. However, an agency can respond 
to a Supreme Court case in important ways other than compliance and implementation. For 
example, in a case analyzed in Part 5 of this thesis, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal 
Reserve should be granted “greatest deference” in determining what activities banks can engage 
in.16 The Supreme Court affirmed to all lower courts that the Federal Reserve is allowed to 
stretch its authority in determining what activities it can permit its banks to engage in. As 
explained in Part 5, the Federal Reserve responded to this decision by expanding the list of 
permitted activities for its banks. This expansion would not be measured under Spriggs measure 
of compliance or Canon and Johnson’s measure of implementation. In this way, Spriggs and 
Canon and Johnson leave out of their analysis many cases in which the Supreme Court impacts 
agencies. Through my research, I expand the understanding of the judicial-agency relationship 
																																																								
16 Board of Governors FRS v Investment Company Institute, 450 U.S. 46 (1981) 
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by moving past just the use of compliance and implementation as a measure judicial impact on 
agencies. 
B. Regulatory Tool and Roadblock Theory 
 Drawing on the existing literature and the research discussed throughout this thesis, I 
have developed my own framework to understand the judicial-agency relationship. I refer to this 
framework as the Regulatory Tool and Roadblock Theory. Regulatory agencies have many 
goals, and they seek to accomplish these goals through making rules and taking enforcement 
actions. However, due to constraints, regulators cannot focus on all of their goals. As brought 
forward through Seidenfeld’s purposive process, regulators will chose to take action to achieve a 
goal when the roadblocks in the way of achieving a goal are limited and have easily discernible 
solutions.  
 Through my research, I have observed that the Supreme Court can impact agencies by 
providing them with the easily discernible solutions they need to work around roadblocks and 
achieve their goals. I call these solutions, “regulatory tools.” As one example, some federal 
agencies during the Burger Court had goals to remove regulations on banks. However, these 
agencies were often unable to do so because strict state banking laws, which federal regulators 
could not control, acted as roadblocks in the way of achieving deregulation. However, in my 
research, the Supreme Court often times granted federal agencies the ability to override state 
laws. This ability to override states was a “regulatory tool” that federal agencies could use to get 
around the roadblock of strict state laws to achieve the goal of banking deregulation. When the 
Supreme Court provides regulatory tools, it makes it more likely that an agency will be willing 
and able to achieve some of its goals that previously had too many unavoidable roadblocks to be 
achieved.  
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 The Court can also impact regulators by adding new roadblocks that prevent agencies 
from accomplishing goals they had previously been able to achieve. In the previous example, 
state agencies with goals to keep strict rules on banks were no longer given the ability to 
counteract federal deregulation with strict state laws. These court decisions, thus, roadblocked 
state agencies from achieving their goal of maintaining strict controls on banks in their states. As 
the Supreme Court attached more regulatory roadblocks to the goals of certain agencies, those 
agencies were forced to focus their resources on more achievable goals. Thus, through providing 
agencies with regulatory tools and regulatory roadblocks, the Supreme Court helped determine 
which agency goals would be accomplished and which agency goals would not be. In terms of 
banking deregulation, this meant that the Supreme Court helped some agencies accomplish their 
deregulatory goals and road-blocked other agencies from accomplishing their pro-regulatory 
goals. Over time, this led to an accelerated deregulation of banks by government agencies. 
 Through my thesis, I seek to prove this regulatory tool and roadblock theory through 
three case studies involving different deregulatory trends: the easing of interest rate caps, 
geographic expansion of banking, and the repeal of Glass-Steagall. I spend the next section 
outlining the economic, political, and administrative conditions that were relevant to the three 
case studies. Throughout the three case studies, I use a survey of Supreme Court decisions and 
subsequent agency actions to support the regulatory tool and roadblock theory. When looking at 
agency responses, I look through available documents from the agency rule-making process for 
explicit references to the Supreme Court decisions and the regulatory tools and roadblocks 
established through those decisions. I also look through relevant litigation that agencies engaged 
in after the Supreme Court decisions to see how these agencies were utilizing their new tools or 
being hampered by their new roadblocks in court proceedings. Through this process, I provide a 
	 16	
justification that my inter-branch theory works to explain the Supreme Court-Agency 
relationship in banking regulation.  
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Part 2: The Context 
 In this section, I outline the context that the three case studies presented in Parts 3, 4, and 
5 take place in. I begin by reviewing the general economic and banking conditions that persisted 
throughout the Burger Court. Specifically, I describe how increased inflation and financial 
innovations pushed commercial banks to pressure their regulators towards deregulation. 
Following, I discuss the Burger Court and the ideological changes that were brought on through 
Richard Nixon’s nominations. Lastly, I provide a general overview of financial regulatory 
agencies. I first provide an overview of financial regulators as a whole, and then detail the 
specific agencies that played an important role in one or more of the three case studies presented 
in Part 3. Through providing the general context of the three case studies, I lay the foundation for 
why the actors within the case studies acted in the manner that they did. 
A. Economic and Banking Conditions 
 In the late 1960s and 1970s, the United States experienced an unusually high level of 
inflation.17 Inflation, as can be seen through figure 3, remained high throughout this time period. 
When inflation first began in the 1960s, it occurred at the same time as the United States was 
experiencing growing unemployment.18 This troubled economic regulators at the time because 
classical economic theory had dictated that inflation and unemployment should carry an inverse 
relationship. Generally, monetary policy setters at the Federal Reserve could curb inflation 
through increasing interest rates. However, with unemployment also rising, regulators were 
worried that increasing interest rates would dampen an already bleak economy. It was not until 
																																																								
17 European Union. “Historic Inflation United States –CPI inflation.” Inlation.EU Worldwide 
Inflation Data, European Union, www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/united-states/historic-
inflation/cpi-inflation-united-states.aspx. 
18 Bureau of Labor Force Particiaption. https://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet	
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policy setters in the late 1970s, led by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, finally decided 
to raise interest rates at the cost of inducing a recession that inflation was finally able to ease.19 
 1970s inflation had a significant impact on the banking industry. Inflation causes an 
increase in interest rates as individuals and companies demand more money to meet their needs. 
																																																								
19 Brandl, Michael W. “Financial Markets Through Time.” Money, Banking, Financial Markets 
& Institutions, Cengage Learning, 2017, pp. 77-102 
	
Figure 3: Inflation and Unemployment in the United States 
 Inflation	1955-2017	
		Source:	European	Union.	“Historic	Inflation	United	States	–CPI	inflation.”	Inlation.EU	
Worldwide	Inflation	Data,	European	Union,	www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/united-states/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-united-states.aspx.		 Unemployment	1955-2017	
	Source:	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics.	https://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet	
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Rising interest rates complicated the profitability of banks because of strict controls by regulators 
on interest payments. Banks were capped on the interest they could pay depositors by a Great 
Depression era rule known as Regulation Q. This was good because it prevented the market from 
driving up interest rates to the point where taking in consumer deposits was no longer profitable 
for banks. However, at the time, Regulation Q meant that depositors at banks could not reap the 
benefits of higher interest rates. Because of interest restrictions, competition in the financial 
market place greatly intensified.20 Banks began losing depositors to less-regulated money market 
funds – this process is called disintermediation – which allowed individuals to receive the more 
generous interest payments than bank accounts. As depositors left banks for money market 
funds, banks lost a traditionally stable source of revenue.  
 Eventually, banks lobbied lawmakers to repeal Regulation Q so that they could pay 
competitive interest rates on their deposits. This ended up being troubling for commercial and 
thrift banks at the time because they earned their profits through interest rates spreads. Banks pay 
interest on the deposits that they hold, and they receive interest payments on the loans that they 
make. It was the spread between the interest payments banks took in and the interest they paid 
that constituted how profitable that a bank could be during this time period. As banks had to pay 
higher interest rates on their deposits, this spread was reduced and banks became even less 
profitable. This was even more troubling because strict usury laws limited banks in many states 
from collecting high interest rates on their loans. Around this time, banks lobbied Congress and 
regulators to get rid of the restrictions that limited who they could make loans to and how much 
interest they could collect on their loans. 
																																																								
20 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Research and Statistics. “A Brief History 
of Deposit Insurance in the United States.” Washington D.C., Sept. 1998 
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 As banks were seeing profits dissipate with high inflation, banks began looking for new 
sources of income other than taking in deposits and making loans.  At the same time, securities 
market innovations were allowing investment banks to boom and earn enviably high profits. The 
Glass-Steagall Act, a Great-Depression era regulation, prevented commercial banks from 
engaging in securities related activities such as underwriting and selling securities such as 
commercial paper. Commercial paper, or unsecured short-term bonds, allowed companies to 
raise money without taking in loans from banks. Instead of relying on banks to make loans to 
these companies, these companies relied on investment banks to underwrite these short-term 
bonds and sell them to investors. Commercial paper transactions became very popular and very 
profitable for investment companies and took away many loan customers from commercial 
banks.21 Additionally, the rise of securitization and collateralized-debt-obligations, such as 
mortgage backed securities, allowed investment companies to profit off loans in ways that banks 
were restricted from.22 As commercial banks continued to lose profits to investment companies, 
banks began to pressure regulators to repeal Glass-Stegall prohibitions and banks to allow banks 
to engage in securities activities.  
B. The Burger Court 
 As mentioned in the introduction, the Burger Court marked a noticeable shift in the 
Supreme Court’s stance on banking issues. As can be seen through Figure 1, the Warren Court 
voted to strengthen regulation roughly 90% of the time. In contrast, the Burger Court voted to 
strengthen regulation roughly 34.3% of the time.23 The ideological shift of the Burger Court can 
																																																								
21 ibid 
22 ibid 
23 Washington University Law School, The Supreme Court Database, Cases selected: Warren 
Court and Burger Court; judgments of the Court, opinions of the court, and per curiam (orally 
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be traced to the addition of four new Justices to the Court from 1969 through 1972. The first 
appointee was Warren Burger himself, who was nominated by Richard Nixon in 1969. 
According to Burger’s Segal-Cover scores – a measure of a Justice’s ideology as perceived by 
newspaper editorials written during upon their appointment – Burger was perceived as 
conservative in relation to the rest of the associate justices.24 In general, conservative justices are 
more likely to vote to remove regulations and liberal Justices are more likely to vote to 
strengthen those regulations. The Segall-Cover scores are a good measure to trace because they 
best capture how regulators and bankers perceived each justice at the time of their nomination.  
 Following Burger, Richard Nixon nominated Harry Blackmun as an associate Justice to 
the Court. Blackmun, who was considered very conservative by the Segal-Cover scores, replaced 
Abe Fortas, who was viewed as liberal.25 In 1971, Nixon nominated William Rehnquist and 
Lewis Powell on the same day. Rehnquist was viewed as one of the most conservative Justices 
on the bench from 1937-2012.26 Richard Nixon’s appointee that most prominently foreshadowed 
the future direction that the Court would take with regards to banking regulation was former 
securities attorney Powell. Powell, who was viewed by the Segal-Cover score as conservative, 
was a notable activist for free enterprise and against government intervention in free markets.27 
Powell gave various speeches warning about the dangers of communism and the spread of 
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socialist ideals on college campuses.28 Powell seemed to be compulsively worried that students 
were not being adequately educated of the dangers about communism. Further, Powell was 
paranoid that communism was brewing in the United States on college campuses via college 
professors. Just one year before his election to the Supreme Court, Powell wrote a confidential 
memo to the chairman of the United States Chamber of Commerce where he urged American 
businesses to engage in a war-like counter-attack on regulation. Powell argues the “American 
economic system is under broad attack” by “New Lefties and other revolutionaries.”29 Powell 
followed that American systems need to fight back these “new lefties” through direct political 
action and policy changes. It is unsurprising that, as soon as Powell was in a position where he 
could impact regulatory policies, he began pushing for deregulation. By packing the Court with 
four new conservative faces, especially with Powell and his intentions of war against regulations, 
Richard Nixon allowed the Court to give way to deregulatory pressure. 
C. The Regulators 
 Banking regulatory agencies, like all agencies, are tasked with ensuring that the laws 
Congress passes to regulate the banking industry are enforced in practice. They do this by taking 
the broad statutes that Congress enacts and turning them into specific rules banks must follow. 
Further, bank regulators are tasked with continuously looking back and ensuring their rules are 
up to date with current banking conditions and innovations. In these ways, banking regulatory 
agencies are similar to all government agencies. However, there are important differences 
between financial regulatory agencies and other agencies. Gillam Metzger has established four 
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main differences between financial regulators and other regulators.30 The first difference he 
describes is administrative structure and institutional design. In general, banking regulators, 
especially the Federal Reserve, are supposed to act rather autonomously from the government. 
For example, the Federal Reserve possesses budgetary autonomy, the freedom from the White 
House oversight, and norms of noninterference. In contrast, most other government agencies lack 
independence from either their executive or legislative supervisory body. This allows banking 
regulatory agencies to focus on goals that they believe are important to their industry rather than 
focusing on short-term political goals. 
 A second difference between banking regulatory agencies and other agencies is their 
relationship with other regulators.31 Banking regulators are often forced to compete with state 
regulators over their joint characteristics. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) must compete for bank charters with state banks. The OCC generates its 
revenue by approving bank charters; however, a bank can chose to get its charter through a state 
regulator or through the OCC. In contrast, other agencies often enjoy a cooperative relationship 
with other regulators. This competitive relationship between state and national bank regulators 
creates deregulatory pressures as both state and federal banks are incentivized to decrease the 
strictness of their rules to attract “regulatory clients.” This issue is discussed more extensively 
later in this section.  
 A third difference between banking regulatory agencies and other agencies is the role the 
market plays.32 According to Metzger, the goal of banking regulation is often to allow free 
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markets to function. This is in contrast to other regulatory agencies, which view the market as 
something that needs to be restrained. As an example, Metzger points to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA views the market as a force that, uncontrolled, will lead to 
health and safety issues. Thus, the EPA seeks to write rules that constrain the free market from 
operating in a natural manner. The perceived difference in the role of the market in regulation 
adjusts the ultimate goals of banking agencies and other agencies. For banking agencies, because 
the ultimate goal is to allow free markets to operate efficiently and effectively, deregulation is 
considered a legitimate and effective policy solution.  
 Rather than being regulated by one agency with broad authority over all banks, banks are 
regulated by a web of regulators who oversee different types of banks and different functions of 
banks. In this way, the multiple banking regulators each have unique goals and jurisdictions that 
allow them to exert varying influence over bank regulatory policies. For the rest of this section, I 
provide a brief overview of the relevant banking regulatory agencies that played a role in the 
three case studies presented in the thesis. 
I. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)  
 The OCC was created during the Civil War as a means to establish a national banking 
system that could help finance the North’s war efforts. The OCC was given the authority to 
charter, or give permission to establish, all national commercial banks. Commercial banks are 
banks that take in deposits and make most of their loans to businesses. To this day, each national 
bank must receive a charter from the OCC in order to operate. The OCC writes rules that banks 
must comply with in order to keep their charter. It also is in charge of supervising banks to 
ensure they are continuing to comply with their rules. Further, the OCC must approve geographic 
bank expansions. Because of these functions, the OCC acts as the chief regulator for national 
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commercial banks. The OCC is an agency within the Treasury Department, meaning that it is 
housed within the executive branch. Because of this, the President appoints the head of the 
agency, which is known as the Comptroller of the Currency. This means that the OCC often 
derives its goals from the current administration. According to its mission, the OCC uses its 
regulatory powers to ensure banks "operate in safe and sound manner, provide fair access to 
financial services, treat customers fairly, and comply with laws and regulation.”33  
 Despite this broad mission statement, the OCC has a powerful incentive to cater to the 
interests of the banks it regulates. The OCC receives its funding through fees from the banks it 
regulates. When a bank is seeking a charter, it has the ability to obtain one from the OCC or from 
a state comptroller of currency. Further, before the 2008 financial crisis, a bank could obtain a 
charter as a national bank from the OCC or as a national thrift from the Office of Thrift 
Supervision. Former Secretary of Treasury Tim Geithner explains that this gluttony of agencies 
with overlapping chartering jurisdictions fosters “regulatory arbitrage.”34 The OCC must cater to 
the interests of its regulatory clients or it will risk losing the clients and thus their funding. 
According to former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, the “OCC at times actively 
sought to induce banks to switch to a national bank charter.”35 Throughout the three case studies 
presented in Part 3, the OCC consistently advocates on behalf of their regulatory clients in their 
pursuit to remove regulations on national bank activities.  
II. Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), and 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
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 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board was established during the Great Depression to 
regulate the activities of thrift institutions. Thrift institutions, also called Savings and Loans, are 
banks that take in deposits and mainly use them to make mortgage loans to homebuyers. After 
the Savings and Loans Crisis in the 1980s, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board relinquished its 
responsibilities to two superseding agencies: The FHFB and the OTS. The FHFB and OTS were 
both dissolved after the 2008 financial crisis due to their negligent regulation of thrifts.  
 During the 1970s, thrift institutions’ profits suffered because of high inflation and high 
interest rates. In 1979, interest rates were over 13%, but thrifts could not pay their depositors 
more than 5.5%.36 Further, thrifts were no longer making sufficient profits making low return 
housing loans, so they sought to make high return loans in other sectors of the economy. In the 
early 1980s, thrifts pressured the FHLBB to remove many of the restrictions that limited what 
kind of loans thrifts could make. Also at the time, the thrift regulator consistently sought to 
exempt its regulatory clients from many state and local regulations to ensure thrifts chartered 
nationally instead of through their respective states.37 According to Ben Bernanke, he saw thrift 
regulators were “focused too much on preserving a regulatory client and not enough on the 
broader risks to the system.”38 This led to many thrifts taking on too much risk that, in large part, 
led to the Savings and Loans Crisis of the 1980s. After the FHLBB dissolved, its superseding 
agencies became “notoriously weak” supervisors.39 Throughout the three case studies, thrift 
regulators consistently used Supreme Court decisions to justify the removal of regulations on 
thrifts.  
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III. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
 The FDIC was created during the Great Depression to help stabilize the banking sector in 
a time of crisis and prevent further “bank runs” and bank failures. Before the FDIC existed, if a 
depositor was worried that its bank was at risk of failing, depositors would come to the bank and 
demand that they get their money back before the bank would fail. Thus, a bank already at risk of 
failing is even more likely to fail as depositors withdraw the limited reserves the bank keeps on 
hand – this is called a bank run. Because of asymmetric information, these bank runs often 
become contagious. Depositors remain unaware of how a bank is spending their deposits, so if 
depositors see one bank is failing, they are unaware how likely their bank is to fail as well. This 
causes bank runs to spread to healthy and safe banks, and thus puts the entire banking system at 
risk. The FDIC was established to ensure depositors that if their bank does fail, the FDIC would 
pay the depositor up to a certain amount of deposits that they had held at the bank.  
 The FDIC has two main roles: to insure depositors and to resolve failed banks. The FDIC 
plays a regulatory role by establishing rules that members of the fund must follow in order to be 
insured.40 The FDIC also must approve any bank mergers or acquisitions for any insured bank. 
In order to build the fund to insure deposits, the FDIC takes in fees from insured banks. Congress 
does not appropriate any money to the FDIC, so unless a specific statute refills the fund with 
taxpayer money, the fund is made up entirely of fees from the institutions the fund regulates. In 
the 1980s, the thrift deposit insurance fund went bankrupt after failed thrifts needed $60 billion 
to pay out depositors in the wave of failed savings and loans.41 After the thrift deposit insurance 
went bankrupt, the FDIC saw the importance of both providing a safe overall banking system 																																																								
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and having a large enough fund to cover large losses. In order to maintain a sizable insurance 
fund, Congress changed the mandate of the FDIC in 1991 to require that they resolve failing 
firms “at the lowest possible cost to the deposit insurance fund.”42 Because of this, the FDIC had 
to focus its banking supervision on ensuring that their fund was not at risk. According to Ben 
Bernanke, the FDIC was “tenacious about protecting the deposit fund,” but that sometimes this 
meant the FDIC put the interests of the fund “ahead of the interests of the broader financial 
system.”43 In terms of deregulation, it was important that the FDIC maintained bank profitability, 
because lack of profits could lead to bank failures, and bank failures would put the fund at risk. 
Thus, in the face of inflation and increased competition from investment companies, the FDIC 
promoted deregulation as a means to maintain bank profitability and stave off bank failures. 
IV. The Federal Reserve (the Fed) 
 The Federal Reserve, which was established in the wake of the 1907 banking crisis, has 
many functions in the banking system. The Federal Reserve holds reserves for its member banks, 
meaning that it serves as a bank for banks. Importantly, the Federal Reserve establishes the 
monetary policy that determines the money supply and the interest rates in the economy. The 
Federal Reserve also acts as a lender of last resort during financial crises to ensure that troubled 
banks do to not fail. While these roles are important, in this thesis, I focus on the Federal Reserve 
in its role as a bank supervisor. After the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, all Bank Holding 
Companies were required to register with the Federal Reserve and comply with its rules.44 In this 
way, the Federal Reserve acts as the chief regulator for bank holding companies. Bank holding 
companies are companies that own banks. Further, all banks that are members of the Federal 
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Reserve System are bound to the rules of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve Board has 
the ultimate responsibility for bank supervision within the Fed.45 The board must approve 
mergers and acquisitions by bank holding companies and member banks. This is important 
because, in the time period of the three case studies, bank holding companies were restricted 
from purchasing many types of non-bank companies. The Federal Reserve had the ultimate say 
in what type of companies bank holding companies were able to purchase.  
 Because the Federal Reserve Board has the ultimate say over bank regulation, the Federal 
Reserve Chairman has significant discretion over the direction the Fed takes banking regulation. 
The President appoints the Federal Reserve chairman for four-year terms. From 1970 to 1978, 
the Federal Reserve Chairman was Arthur Burns. Richard Nixon, a staunch opponent of 
government interference in free markets, nominated Burns. Paul Volcker followed Burns. 
Volcker served at a time with very high inflation, and his major goal was to combat inflation and 
its harmful effects. The final relevant Federal Reserve Chairman to my research was Alan 
Greenspan. Greenspan, a protégé of Ayn Rand – the notable laissez fairre capitalist – was a vocal 
proponent of deregulation. Greenspan also maintained a very close relationship with banks and 
investment companies, and was supportive of the integration of the banks and investment 
banks.46 Throughout Part 5, Greenspan’s Federal Reserve used tools granted to the Fed by the 
Burger Court to meet his deregulatory goals.  
 In addition to the OCC, the OTS, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve, many other 
agencies play a role in the regulation of banks. The Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice enforces antitrust laws and oversees bank mergers and bank expansions. The SEC 
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monitors the securities activities of financial institutions and works to protect consumers from 
harmful securities transactions. The abundance of bank regulatory agencies creates a web of 
regulators that oversees banking activity. 
 
Figure 4: Banking Regulator Chart 
Bank 
Regulator 
Role Policy Goals Implications for 
Banking 
Deregulation 
Office of the 
Comptroller of 
Currency 
Regulator to national 
commercial banks. 
Sets standards all its 
member banks must 
adhere to. 
Due to its reliance on 
regulatory fees, seeks to 
induce state banks and 
national thrifts to switch 
to national commercial 
charters to increase its 
regulatory clients.  
Staunch advocate 
for policies that 
would increase the 
profitability of 
national banks. 
Federal Home 
Loans Banking 
Board, Federal 
Housing 
Financing 
Board, Office 
of Thrift 
Supervision 
(All Defunct) 
Regulator to national 
thrifts and thrift 
holding companies. 
Sets standards all 
chartered thrifts must 
adhere too. 
Due to its reliance on 
regulatory fees, seeks to 
induce state banks, state 
thrifts, and national banks 
to re-charter as national 
thrifts.  
Staunch advocate 
for policies that 
would increase the 
profitability of 
national thrifts.  
Federal 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Corporation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Insures the deposits of 
state and national 
commercial banks and 
resolves failing banks. 
Insures depositors in 
federally insured banks in 
order to ensure 
confidence in the banking 
system and prevent bank 
failures. 
After the 
insolvency of the 
thrift insurance 
fund, the FDIC’s 
was obliged to 
resolve failing 
firms “at the 
lowest possible 
cost to the deposit 
insurance fund.” 
Wanted banks to 
remain profitable, 
even if that meant 
deregulation, in 
order to reduce 
bank failures. 
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Federal 
Reserve 
In addition to its role 
in monetary policy, 
the Fed is responsible 
for state and federal 
bank holding 
companies. The Board 
is responsible for the 
supervision and the 
Reserve Banks are 
responsible for 
enforcement. 
Because bank regulation 
is only one aspect of the 
Federal Reserve’s roles, 
regulatory policy goals 
can be different based on 
who are the Federal 
Reserve chairman and 
their board.  
Chairman Volcker 
and, especially, 
Chairman 
Greenspan 
oversaw drastic 
rule alterations 
leading to 
deregulation. 
Antitrust 
Division  
Enforces antitrust 
legislation to promote 
economic 
competition. 
Ensures that market 
shares of individual 
banks in certain 
geographic markets do 
not become monopolistic. 
Further, ensure that banks 
are not engaging in trust-
like interest rate setting. 
Opposed 
deregulation in 
horizontal 
expansion due to 
its anti-
competitive 
effects. 
Securities and 
Exchange 
Committee 
Monitors investment 
banks and securities 
activities to protect 
investors 
Ensures that investors are 
investing and trading in a 
fair and transparent 
market place. 
Equipped to focus 
on investor 
protections 
without a 
significant 
concern for 
structural changes 
in the banking 
industry. 
 
Part 3: Case Study 1 – Interest Rate Caps on Bank and Thrift Loans 
 The first case study looks at the impact that the Supreme Court had on regulators as they 
removed laws capping the interest rates banks could collect on their loans. Usury restrictions, 
laws limiting the amount of interest lenders can collect, have ancient roots. Greek Philosopher 
Aristotle believed, “money ought not to ‘give birth’ to more money.”47 Ancient Romans 
developed a theory that, because money was barren, the taking of interest was unnatural, and 
																																																								
47 Piketty, Thomas, and Goldhammer, Arthur. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2017. P. 530. 
	 33	
therefor should be forbidden.48 Usury restrictions are specifically mentioned in both the bible and 
the Quran. The Old Testament prohibits interest taking from one Jew to another Jew, but not 
between a Jew and a non-Jew. The New Testament bans all interest taking, and the Koran bans 
all excessive interest taking.49 During the enlightenment period, non-religious arguments to 
impose strict usury restrictions grew in importance. English merchants pointed to Holland’s 
economic success under strict interest rates as evidence that usury restrictions lead to prosperous 
economic conditions.50 Further, Adam Smith wrote that strict usury restrictions would ensure 
that money would not be lent to those who are most likely to engage in economically destructive 
activities.51  
 Throughout early modern and colonial times, societies had to balance their religious and 
moral doctrines banning interest with the commercial needs of credit for their economy.52 The 
need for credit pushed Protestant Reformation movements to take away usury restrictions as a 
religious doctrine. Throughout the Enlightenment Period, many scholars began to observe the 
negative effects of strict usury laws. Usury limits prevented mutually beneficial trade among 
informed and consenting adults. Further, usury limits force desperate borrowers into the hands of 
often times violent “black market” lenders. In the Colonial era in the United States, usury 
restrictions were as strict as 6% in states like Massachusetts. However, westward expansion after 
the Revolution made usury laws less strict, as borrowers were willing to pay a high premium for 
the abundant fertile land.53 However, once the Civil War brought economic trouble onto the 
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United States, Congress passed the National Currency Act of 1863, which imposed stricter usury 
laws on lenders.54 In 1864, this act was amended to limit national banks to charge the interest 
rate that was allowed in the states that the bank was located. This gave the states considerable 
power in determining what banks could charge borrowers on their loans.55 
 Up until the Burger Court, there was considerable variation in the interest a borrower 
could be charged on his or her loans. Because inter-state banking was scarce, the location where 
an individual or company took out a loan determined what the maximum interest rate that bank 
could charge was. After high inflation forced regulators to get rid of restrictions on the interest 
banks could pay on deposits, banks were being forced by market pressure to pay higher interest 
on their deposits. In states with strict usury laws, the spread between the interest banks were 
making on their loans and paying on their deposits was being squeezed to the point of 
unprofitability. Throughout the 1970s, banks looked for ways to get around these strict state 
usury restrictions.  
A. Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp (1978) 
 One bank that sought to get around strict usury restrictions was First of Omaha Bank. 
First of Omaha Bank was located in Nebraska, which had notoriously loose usury laws.56 First of 
Omaha Service Corporation, a company owned by First of Omaha Bank, began to advertise First 
of Omaha Bank's credit card in states outside of Nebraska. First of Omaha sought to “export” 
Nebraska's interest rates to other states by advertising its bank's credit cards to states with strict 
usury laws. Section 85 of the National Banking Act dictates that national banks are subject to the 
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interest rate limits by the state they are “located” in.57 When a consumer used his or her First of 
Omaha credit card, no matter what state the consumer was in, the actual payment of his or her 
transaction would take place in Nebraska. Thus, First of Omaha's credit card could charge the 
highest allowable rate under Nebraska’s law; even if this rate was considered usurious, meaning 
above the allowable limit, in the state the transaction took place.58  
 Many states were upset that First of Omaha was advertising its credit card to borrowers in 
their states. Because First of Omaha could make high profits on interest from delinquent credit 
card accounts, the bank could offer lower fees on its credit cards. This gave First of Omaha Bank 
a competitive advantage in the credit card market against banks located in states with high 
interest rates. Because the Nebraska usury laws allowed for an 18% interest rate cap, the Omaha 
credit card subjected its user's unpaid balances to that rate.59 National Banks headquartered in 
Minnesota, such as Marquette National Bank, could only obtain 12% interest rates on the unpaid 
balances on the credit they extended because of Minnesota law.60 This disadvantaged Marquette 
and other national banks located in Minnesota because they could not afford to offer low or no 
fee credit cards. In Marquette, Marquette National Bank and the state of Minnesota challenged 
whether First of Omaha was allowed to "export interest rates" under Section 85 of the National 
Banking Act.61  
 The question presented to the Supreme Court in Marquette was whether Section 85 of the 
National Banking Act "authorized national banks based in one state to charge its out-of-state 																																																								
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credit-card customers an interest rate on unpaid balance allowed by its home state."62 Marquette 
argued that a national bank could not export interest rates because this would conflict with the 
Congressional policy of competitive equality of state and national banks. Allowing banks to 
export interest rates would allow national banks, who have the ability to move headquarters, to 
move to states with high interest rates. This would allow national banks to have a competitive 
advantage over state banks in states with high usury laws.63 Further, Marquette National Bank 
argued that allowing a national bank to export interest rates goes against the plain meaning of 
Section 85 of the National Banking Act because the credit is extended to outside the state.64 In 
addition to Marquette National Bank, the State of Minnesota joined the case and argued that 
allowing other states to export interest rates inhibits Minnesota's ability to protect its citizens 
from usury.65  
 Omaha First National pointed out that Section 85 allows national banks to charge interest 
rate on their loans equal to the state in which the bank is located. Further, although a customer 
might use Omaha’s credit card outside of Nebraska, all of the card’s banking transactions were 
conducted in Nebraska. The credit card applications, the sending and receiving of payments, and 
the actual extension of credit all took place in Nebraska. Omaha First National argued that 
Minnesota's State Law 48 155, which restricted interest rates that borrowers in the state could be 
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charged on loans, was preempted by Section 85 and did not apply to credit that was extended in 
Nebraska.66  
 The Supreme Court had to first decide whether federal law preempted state law with 
regard to interest rate limits. Minnesota law explicitly said borrowers in the state could not be 
charged interest rates higher than the state maximum. If the court decided that state interest rate 
maximums had to be respected, then a bank in Nebraska would not be able to export its interest 
rates to Minnesota because its borrowers were subject to Minnesota’s interest rate limits. If the 
court decided that federal law does preempt state interest rate maximums, then the Court would 
have to decide if the preemption of Section 85 of the National Banking Act over state interest 
rate maximums would allow banks in states with loose interest rate caps to export their interest 
rates to other states. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that federal law did preempt state 
interest rate maximums.67 Further, the Court affirmed the preemption of Section 85 allows 
national banks to export their state’s interest rate maximums. Because Omaha National Bank 
conducted its activities in Nebraska, its credit card transactions were located in Nebraska and the 
bank could use Nebraska’s maximum interest rate.68 Though the court admitted this does limits 
the ability of states to protect their citizens from usury, the Supreme Court argued that this was 
never the intention of Congress.69  
B. Regulatory Response 
 The ability of federal regulators to preempt state usury laws, which was established in 
Marquette, paved the way for two important regulatory movements. First, it established a 
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regulatory tool of preemption for national regulators with goals of removing restrictions on 
banks. Regulators like the OCC and FHLBB, who sought to appease their regulatory clients 
whose profits were being crushed by rising interest rates, used this preemption tool to override 
strict state interest rate maximums. Second, it imposed a regulatory roadblock of federal 
preemption on state regulators who wanted to maintain strict usury laws. State regulators, who 
previously had the ability to control interest rate maximums, now were at the whim of federal 
regulators. Even worse for state regulators pushing for strict usury laws, national banks began to 
leave their states and flock to states with the highest interest rate caps so they could reap the 
benefits of higher interest rates. This further hurt states with strict usury laws as they saw 
national banks leave their state.  
 
 
I. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
At the time of Marquette, the OCC was trying to appease its regulatory clients by pushing 
for looser interest rate maximums. Bank profits were being restricted by strict usury laws, and 
many argued that these usury laws were restricting available credit in many states.70 The OCC 
was quick to use the preemptive powers that Marquette gave the federal agency over state 
regulators in order to help its national banks circumvent strict state usury laws. In October 1979, 
speaking at a Senate hearing for a bill to preempt state interest rate restrictions on certain loans, 
Comptroller of the Currency John Heimann used the Supreme Court case to urge Congress to 
pass the bill. Heimann pointed to Marquette in affirming that Congress had the authority to 
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override state laws.71 Heimann argued that "laboring under this weight of this expanding body of 
case law" it is clear that interest rate caps are becoming obsolete. Heimann used Marquette and 
its preemptive powers to convince the Senate to override state laws. Heimann was ultimately 
successful in this lobbying, because Congress used its federal preemptive powers many times to 
override strict state laws.72 
In addition to just lobbying efforts on the behalf of the OCC, the OCC also used 
Marquette to justify its own rule-making with regards to usury deregulation. In 1996, the OCC 
pointed to Marquette to preempt strict state laws about the fees a bank could charge on a loan. 
Though these fees were not technically interest, they still amounted to an additional cost of 
borrowing loans. Thus, many states had laws that restricted banks from charging excessive fees 
on loans. Through its ruling, the OCC overruled states that limited these fees. The OCC wrote 
that, "This interpretation is consistent with OCC precedent and regulations governing the 
definition of 'interest' for purposes of Section 85 as upheld by the Supreme Court."73 The OCC 
included a footnote at the end of this section specifying that it was referring to Marquette. Thus, 
the OCC used the tool of preemption to further deregulate the ability of states to protect their 
consumers from excessive borrowing costs from national banks. In 2001, the OCC again used 
federal preemption that was derived from Marquette to preempt states that were restricting 
national banks from lending for auto-loans.74  A year later, in 2002, the OCC used preemption to 
allow national banks to circumvent state restrictions on costs associated with conducting 																																																								
71 United States. Cong. House. Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. Hearing on 
H.R.2515, April 3 and 5, 1979. 96th Congress. First Session. Washington (Statement by John 
Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency).  72	See	“Congressional	Deregulation”	
73 Williams, Julie L. “Interpretive Letter 744.” Department of Treasury, The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency,, 21 Aug. 1996, www.occ.treas.gov/topics/licensing/interpretations-
and-actions/1996/int744.pdf	
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"business using electronic technologies."75  Thus, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the OCC used 
preemption, a tool given to it by the Burger Court, to get around state laws that roadblock them 
from achieving their goal of increasing bank profitability.  
II. Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) 
  The FHLBB made even quicker use of its federal preemption ability after Marquette. In 
1980, the FHLBB issued an interpretation that preempted state interest rate maximums on loans 
that had been given to one borrower and then assumed by another borrower. Thus, a bank could 
allow a new borrower to assume another borrower's old loan at an interest rate that was higher 
than what was allowable by state laws.76  Less than ten days later, the FHLBB issued another 
interpretation that preempted state laws that prohibited lenders from charging "points" on loans. 
The interpretation described a point as a "fee, premium bonus loan origination fee, service 
charge, or any other charge equal to 1% of the principal of a loan."77 In both of these two 
interpretations, the FHLBB cited Marquette in deriving its authority to preempt state laws.  
 Lastly, two months after these interpretations, the FHLBB put out a final rule stating that 
preemption of state usury laws in housing loans can be applied to all loans made by federally 
chartered banks, credit unions, thrifts, state chartered banks insured federally, members of the 
Federal Reserve or FHLB, and all loans that are insured or invested in by HUD, FNMA, 
FHLMC, or GNMA.78 Through these three interpretations, the FHLBB took the preemption tool 
bestowed onto it by the Supreme Court and used it to deregulate interest rate controls on the 
mortgage market.  
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III. State Deregulation 
  Unlike federal regulatory agencies, preemption served as a regulatory roadblock for state 
regulators. Allowing preemption of state interest rate limits impeded the ability of a state agency 
or legislature to regulate the interest rates charged to borrowers in their state.79 Further, because 
banks in states with low interest rate maximums were becoming less profitable, states feared that 
banks would seek to re-charter in other states to reap the benefits of higher interest rates. In order 
to prevent this from happening, states that had traditionally strict interest maximums loosened 
their rules to permit the charging of higher interest rates. In 1979, one year after Marquette, 
many states increased their interest rate limits. Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, 
Tennessee, and Texas all eased their interest rate maximums, and in subsequent years many 
states continued to follow their direction.80 By allowing federal preemption of usury laws, the 
Court set off a “race towards the bottom” as states sought to deregulate their interest rate 
maximums in order to attract national banks to their state, or at the very least, keep national 
banks from leaving their states.81 This race to the bottom even furthered the deregulation of 
interest rate caps.  
IV. Congressional Deregulation 
  Though not an agency, Congress can enact statutes that govern the conduct of banks, and 
therefore can  also act as a banking regulator. Because Congress also acts as a federal regulator 
over banks, it was also given the tool of preemption by Marquette. Congress was quick to draft 
bills and enact laws that used this newfound regulatory tool. In 1979, Congress set a temporary 
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national interest rate limit on all business and agricultural loans of $25,000 or more, and 
preempted all state limits that considered the new national rate usurious.82 The act also asserted 
that no member bank of the Federal Reserve, FHLB, or federally insured bank was subject to 
state interest rate laws if a state had a cap at less than 10%. Shortly after this act, Congress 
passed Automatic Transfer Accounts at Commercial Banks Authorization.83 This act temporarily 
preempted all state laws explicitly limiting the rate or other fees that a bank may charge on future 
loans or mortgages that were secured by a first lien on the property. Congress relied on its 
preemptive authority to pass this law, specifically using the word preempt 14 times in the 
relatively short legislation. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
of 1980 (DIDMCA) then made these temporary preemptions permanent.84 Through these bills, 
Congress took a regulatory tool that it was given by the Supreme Court, preemption, and turned 
it into statutory deregulation of interest rate caps. After Marquette, Congress had a clear and 
legitimate legal basis to preempt state laws. In this way, Marquette had a significant impact on 
statutory interest rate deregulation.        
C. Interest Rate Caps on Bank and Thrift Loans Conclusion 
 The Marquette decision brought on a wave of deregulation in the banking system. The 
decision provided regulators with goals to ease interest rate restrictions a tool – preemption – 
they could use to do so. The OCC and the FHLBB, who were motivated to help their regulatory 																																																								
82 An Act to authorize on a Temporary Basis Certain Business and Agricultural Loans, 
Notwithstanding Interest Limitations in State Constitutions or States, and for Other Purposes. 
Pub. L. 96-104. 93 Stat. 789. 5 Nov 1979. Congress.gov 
83 An act to authorize automatic transfer accounts at commercial banks, remote service units at 
Federal savings and loan associations, and share draft accounts at Federal credit unions during 
that period beginning on December 31, 1979, and ending on April 1, 1980. Pub. L. 96-161. 93 
Stat. 1233. 28 Dec 1979. Congress.gov 
84 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Pub. L. 96-221. 94 
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clients remain profitable, used preemption to expand the array of state interest rate laws that 
national banks were able to circumvent. Congress, whose main motivation was reelection, were 
heavily influenced by industry lobbyists and campaign contributions to deregulate interest rate 
caps.85 At the same time that the FHLBB, OCC, and Congress were pushing towards their goal 
of interest rate cap deregulation, state regulators with goals to protect their citizens from usury 
were roadblocked by preemption from doing so. States with strict usury laws saw banking 
activity migrate away. These states were ultimately forced to make a decision to conform to the 
trend of deregulation in usury or decimate their state’s banking system. In this manner, the 
Supreme Court helped decide that the deregulatory goals of removing restrictions on interest 
rates would be achieved at the expense of the pro-regulatory goals of maintaining restrictions on 
bank loans. Over time, this allowed the Supreme Court to significantly impact the deregulation 
of interest rate maximums on bank loans.  
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Part 4: Case Study 2 – Geographic Expansion of Banking 
 Bank expansion has been a contentious topic in the United States since the country’s 
inception. In a typical economic model, resources flow from an area of richness to an area of 
scarcity. In banking, this usually means that savings flow from agricultural areas to industrial 
areas. This is because agricultural areas tend to have rich savings after their harvests, and 
industrial area tends to need savings to invest in capital. However, in early United States, this 
savings flow did not occur. This is because the policy makers in agricultural areas of the United 
States, predominately the south, tended to be of the planter class.86 Members of the planter class 
did not want to entangle planter savings with industrial interests. Planter opposition to integrating 
agrarian and industrial banks helped lead to the demise of the Second National Bank.87 It was not 
until non-planter society in the South could gain control of the banking sector that capital could 
flow from agrarian South to develop the industrial southern cities such as Charlotte and 
Atlanta.88 However, policies in many states continued to prohibit banks from expanding past the 
limits of their towns, and in many cases, from expanding past the walls of their own buildings. 
 During the Civil War, the National Banking Act established the OCC, which officially 
chartered national banks. However, the McFadden Act of 1927 forced chartered banks to obey 
state branching laws. This gave state bank regulators the ultimate control of bank expansion. 
National banks in many states, especially agriculture-dominated states in the South and Midwest, 
were prevented to expand by strict state branching laws. Figure 6 demonstrates the extent that 
state branching laws limited the ability of banks to geographically expand. In states such as 
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Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri, national banks were prohibited from expanding past the limits 
of their own building as recently as 1979.89  
 In many ways, this geographic restriction on banks was harmful. Banks who were 
confined to small areas had bank portfolios that were completely tied to the economic condition 
of that area. If a bank was restricted to only make loans in a rural town in Missouri, and that 
town was struck by a major tornado, that bank could easily fail. If a tornado hits, depositors 
would take money out of the bank to pay for their property damages, and at the same time, 
borrowers would have to forgo paying their loan payments to pay for the tornado damage. Banks 
have always sought to get around tight geographic restrictions to prevent issues like this from 
being a problem. One way banks tried doing so was through bank holding companies. Bank 
holding companies were companies who owned banks. These holding companies would 
purchase banks in different areas to get around strict branching laws and diversify their loan 
portfolio. However, because these companies circumvented the intent of strict branching laws, 
regulators sought to restrict their growth ability. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 made 
it so all bank holding companies had to register with the Federal Reserve and meet the Fed’s 
regulatory requirements. The Federal Reserve had to approve any bank holding company 
expansions, and Bank Holding Companies were restricted from buying banks in different states.  
 In this section, I review the Court’s impact on three separate methods of bank expansion 
used by banks and bank holding companies during the era of the Burger Court.  
A. Geographic Expansion Method 1: Branching 
 The most basic method of bank expansion is bank branching. Branching is when one 
bank opens up new facilities. In order for a bank to branch, a state bank must get approval from 																																																								
89 Mengle, David L. 1990. “The Case for Interstate Branch Banking.” Federal Reserve Bank of 
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its state regulator and national banks must get approval from the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC). Further, a member of the Office of the Comptroller of Currency is restricted by 
the McFadden Act to only approve of branching activity that would be allowable under the law 
of the state where the national bank is located. State regulators can intervene when the OCC 
approves a national bank to branch if that state regulator believes the branch is against state laws. 
This leads to a potential conflict when state and national regulators differ in their approval of a 
proposed branch of a national bank. In 1969, the Supreme Court heard a case that revolved 
around this conflict. 
I. First National Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson (1969) 
 In the 1960s, Florida had a policy of unit branching. This means that a bank was not 
allowed to branch outside of the walls of its own building.90 One bank, First National Bank in 
Plant City, had plans to begin using an armored car to pick up deposits for its commercial clients. 
At the same time, the bank also opened a receptacle where its retail clients could drop off their 
deposits. The armored car could thus come and pick up these deposits and bring them to the 
bank. The OCC approved these new services so long as the customers signed a contract saying 
that the armored car was the agent of the customer and not the agent of the bank. Before the 
armored car service began, the Florida Comptroller of the Currency, Fred Dickinson, sent a cease 
and desist letter to the national bank. The letter said that the armored car and receptacle services 
constituted branching under Florida Law and was, therefore, illegal.91 This seemed valid to the 
Florida Comptroller of Currency because federal law dictated that, if state banks were unable to  
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branch, national banks could not branch either.92 State banks were prohibited from providing 
similar car and receptacle services because Florida regulators considered those activities 
branching. However, it was unclear whether the car and receptacle services constituted branching 
under federal law. First National challenged Dickinson’s cease and desist order, arguing that the 
services were not branching activities under the federal law and thus, were not prohibited by 
Florida’s laws banning branching.  
 There were two important legal questions involved in Dickinson. First, which definition 
of “branching” should be used in determining if a banking activity is considered branching: the 
state or federal definition. If the state definition should be used, then the armored car services 
were considered branching in Florida and should not be allowed. However, if the national 
definition of branching was the definition that should be used, then it begged a second question: 
do the armored car and receptacle services provided by Plant City constitute branching under the 
federal definition of branching. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the state 
definition preempted federal definition, and therefore, the OCC approved activities were not 
permitted in Florida.93 The Supreme Court ultimately held that federal law preempted state law 
in determining the definition of branching. However, the Court held that even under the federal 
definition of branching, armored car and receptacle services were considered branching.94 The 
majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger and was supported by Justices Black, 
Harlan, Brennan, Marshall and White. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion that was 
supported by Justice Stewart. 
II. Regulatory Response 
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 Though the Supreme Court ultimately did not allow First National to operate its new 
services, it did allow federal regulators to preempt state regulators in determining whether an 
activity was considered branching. This preemption provided a tool for federal regulators who 
sought to remove restrictions on national banks from expanding. At the same time, federal 
preemption provided a regulatory roadblock to state regulators who sought to restrict bank 
expansion.  
a) State Response 
 Because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the state definition of branching 
should be considered over the federal definition of branching, it created a natural experiment for 
the three years before Supreme Court heard the case. Fort those three years, regulators acted 
upon the assumption that the state definition of branching overrode the federal definition.95 It 
provides a glimpse at what would have happened if the Supreme Court had affirmed that states 
could preempt the national definition of branching. 
 After the Fifth Circuit decision, state regulators began to alter their definitions of 
branching in order to ban activities that would not be considered branching under federal law. In 
Illinois, where there was a unit branching policy, the banking commission and state Attorney 
General deemed all off premise banking activity branching. This included the newly popular 
“Lectro Tellers,” which served as predecessors to the modern day ATM.96 In Georgia, state 
courts used Dickinson (5th Cir. 1968) to strengthen their branching laws restrictions. In one case, 
the Court said that, because of Dickinson (5th Cir. 1968), calling potential customers off premises 
or closing deals off premises would be considered branching. Thus, simply making a phone call 																																																								
95 First National Bank In Plant City v. Dickinson, Motion for Leave to File Brief for the First 
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to a customer outside of the bank building was banned in Georgia.97 Lastly, the Attorney General 
in North Carolina, citing Dickinson (5th Cir. 1968), ruled that all loan production offices outside 
of a bank constitute a branch. This was important because many banks had arrangements with 
car dealerships where the dealership would help their clients fill out loan applications for 
automobile financing loans. Through the North Carolina Attorney General’s ruling, this practice 
was considered branching and was therefore prohibited.98  
 The lower court ruling provided state authorities with goals to restrict bank expansion a 
regulatory tool, state preemption, to achieve their goal. Through the examples provided above, it 
is clear that states used this tool to restrict bank expansion. After the Supreme Court gave the 
power to define branching back to federal authorities, it restricted state authorities from 
expanding their definitions of branching to include any activity the state regulator wanted to 
prohibit. This provided state regulators with a regulatory roadblock, federal preemption, which 
impeded states with goals of restricting bank expansion.  
b) Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 For the OCC, the ruling provided them with a new tool to foster bank expansion. The 
OCC, always looking for ways to promote the interests of their regulatory clients, sought to 
increase national bank expansion. Giving national banks a greater ability to expand than state 
banks, which were still bound to the state definition of branching, would allow the OCC to 
attract state banks to re-charter as national banks. Thus, the OCC used Dickinson to limit the 
federal definition of branching in a way that removed many restrictions on national bank 
expansions. As one example, in 1974, the OCC ruled that the use of Customer-Bank 																																																								
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Communication Terminals (CBCT) was not considered branching. These terminals, which were 
generally located in convenience stores, allowed bank customers to initiate bank transactions and 
withdrawal off premise. The ruling allowed national banks in states with strict branching laws to 
make use of these terminals and expand their banks’ clientele. In making this ruling, the OCC 
referenced Dickinson in asserting that it has the power over states to define branching. This 
preemptive tool allowed the OCC to override any state rules banning CBTCs as branching 
activities. 
  In 1985, the OCC again used Dickinson to strengthen the ability of national banks to 
branch. In Mississippi, state commercial banks were prohibited from branching outside of 100 
miles of their principal location. However, at the same time, Mississippi thrifts were able to 
branch throughout the state. The OCC ruled that, because thrifts offered many traditional 
“banking” services, national banks should be able to expand as far as thrifts. Subsequently, the 
OCC permitted national banks to branch throughout the state. This was challenged in Court, but 
the Fifth Circuit ruled that, because Dickinson established that the definition of branching was 
subject to national law and not state law, the OCC’s ruling was correct.99 In this example, 
Dickinson again provided the OCC with a tool, federal preemption of the definition of branching, 
which allowed it to further deregulate bank branching regulations.  
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B. Geographic Expansion Method 2: Mergers and Acquisitions 
 In order to get around strict branching laws, many banks and bank holding companies 
attempted to merge or acquire other banks in new districts. By doing this, banks and bank 
holding companies gained two benefits. First, they could expand in a manner that allowed them 
to gain a more diversified portfolio of depositors and loans. Second, they could lessen their 
competition by merging with or acquiring a direct competitor or a potential competitor. Because 
of these benefits, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve were 
generally willing to approve reasonable merger and acquisition requests of national banks or 
bank holding companies. However, because mergers and acquisitions can have anticompetitive 
effects, antitrust regulators such as the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
the Federal Trade Commission began to challenge bank mergers and acquisitions. In 1974, this 
culminated in a multi-case Supreme Court battle between two government agencies of the same 
administration: the OCC and the DOJ. 
I. United States v. Marine Bancorporation (1974) and United States v. Connecticut 
National Bank (1974)  
 United States v. Connecticut National Bank (1974) and United States v. Marine 
Bancorporation (1974) were both legal battles between the DOJ and the OCC. These two cases 
were decided on the same day and had nearly identical ideologically divided votes. At the heart 
of this debate was the scope of the DOJ’s ability to block bank mergers using Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act. Section 7 allowed the government to block mergers or acquisitions that could 
produce substantial anti-competitive effects.100 The Supreme Court had already determined that 
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the government could use this provision to block mergers in the banking industry.101 However, 
Congress clarified in the Bank Merger Act of 1966 that banks were allowed to merge if the anti-
competitive effects of the merger were outweighed by the benefits to the community affected by 
the merger.102  
 In these two cases, the Supreme Court decided two major issues. First, the court had to 
decide whether the potential competition doctrine could be used to block a merger under Section 
7. In Marine Bancorporation, the DOJ tried to stop an OCC approved acquisition under Section 
7 because, it argued, the merger would diminish competition.103 Though the two merging banks 
did not directly compete with each other at the time of the acquisition, the DOJ argued that there 
was a possibility that they would one day be competitive. The DOJ derived this from an antitrust 
doctrine called the potential competition theory. This doctrine argues that if “Company A” in 
“Market A” raises its price, other similar companies would want to enter “Market A” to reap the 
benefits of a higher price. Because of this potential for competition, “Company A” will keep its 
prices low to stave off potential competition.104 Using this doctrine, the DOJ argued that the 
proposed merger would eliminate the potential competition that the two banks presented each 
other, and thus, eliminate the downward pressure that was keeping interest rates down for bank 
consumer. Ultimately, the DOJ’s challenge of the acquisition made its way to the Supreme 
Court, and the OCC joined the case on behalf of the acquiring bank, Marine Bancorporation.  
 The OCC and Marine Bancorporation argued that there was no violation of Section 7 of 
the Clayton Antitrust Act because there was no real potential competition. According to the OCC 
and Marine Bancorporation, the strict state branching laws limiting the ability of the two banks 																																																								
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to enter each other’s markets made it so the two banks did not consider each other potentially 
competitive.105 In a decision that was split along ideological lines, the Supreme Court agreed 
with the OCC and Marine Bancorporation’s argument. In an opinion written by Justice Powell 
and supported by Justices Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, Powell argued that the 
potential competition doctrine must take into account federal and state regulations that make it 
difficult for firms to enter markets.106 When it is unlikely that Bank A in Market A can expand 
into Market B because of strict branching laws, Bank A and a bank in Market B are not potential 
competitors. This was important because it limited the ability of the DOJ to block bank mergers 
and acquisitions using the potential competition doctrine in states with strict branching laws.  
 In addition to potential competition, the second important issue the Court decided in 
Marine Bancorporation and Connecticut was regarding the DOJ’s “relevant market.” When the 
DOJ argues that a merger will create anticompetitive effects under Section 7, it must establish a 
relevant market that would lose market competition if the merger were to go through. In Marine 
Bancorporation and Connecticut, the merging banks and the OCC challenged the relevant 
market that was established by the DOJ. In Connecticut, the DOJ wanted the “standard 
metropolitan statistical area” (SMSA) to be the relevant market in determining whether a merger 
between Connecticut National Bank (CNB) and First New Haven Bank (FNH) would have 
anticompetitive effects. An SMSA was a measure of a geographical area related to a single 
metropolitan area that was used by the census bureau for statistical purpose. The DOJ could 
easily show that the proposed merger would greatly increase the percentage of deposits owned 
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by one bank in the bank’s SMSA.107 The banks and the OCC argued that the SMSA was not a 
relevant market to commercial banking, and therefor, the percentage of deposits owned in the 
SMSA was not relevant to Section 7.108  
 The Supreme Court agreed that the DOJ had the burden to produce sufficient evidence 
that its proposed “relevant market” was actually the local market that was relevant to the 
industry. In an opinion written by Powell and supported by Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, and 
Rehnquist, the Court affirmed that the SMSA was not a relevant market.109 By placing the 
burden of proving that their its market was the true relevant market, the Supreme Court 
handicapped the ability of the DOJ to prosecute mergers with anticompetitive effects. 
a) Regulatory Impact on the Potential Competition Doctrine 
i. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 In both Connecticut and Marine Bancorportion, the Supreme Court made it more 
difficult for the DOJ to use the potential competition doctrine to block a merger. According to 
Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Marine Bancorporation, the case “erects formidable 
barriers to the application of the potential competition doctrine.”110 The potential competition 
doctrine was a tool that the DOJ had at its disposal to try to accomplish its goal of protecting 
market competition. However, by restricting the ability of the DOJ to use the potential 
competition doctrine, the Supreme Court restricted the DOJ from being able to achieve its goal. 
In this way, restricting the DOJ from applying potential competition doctrine served as a 
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regulatory roadblock for the DOJ. To this day, the DOJ has not successfully challenged any bank 
merger in court using the potential competition doctrine.111  
ii. The Federal Reserve 
 The Federal Reserve, which is the regulator who approves bank holding company 
acquisitions, used the Supreme Court decisions to approve new bank acquisitions by bank 
holding companies. In 1976, the Fed approved United Missouri Bancshares, Inc’s acquisition of 
Park Bank of St. Joseph in Missouri. The Fed cited Missouri’s’ restrictive branching laws as the 
reason why the potential competition doctrine was not relevant to the case.112 Through this 
approval, and others like it, the Federal Reserve fostered bank expansions that the state had 
sought to prevent through its strict branching laws. The Supreme Court, by withering away the 
potential competition doctrine, gave regulators who sought to foster bank expansion an easier 
path to do so. This is because regulators like the Federal Reserve could approve mergers and 
acquisitions without having to worry about costly potential competition challenges from other 
banking regulators.  
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b) Supreme Court Regulatory Impact on Defining Relevant Markets 
i. Department of Justice (DOJ)  
 Before Connecticut and Marine Bancorportion, the DOJ did not have to put significant 
resources to defining a relevant market as a part of their antitrust work. The Supreme Court 
decided in The United States v. Pabst Brewing Company (1966) that the failure to prove a 
relevant market was “not an adequate ground for dismissal” of a Section 7 case to block a 
merger.113 In other words, the DOJ did not need to provide an adequate relevant market in order 
to block a merger under Section 7. This allowed the DOJ to use any “sufficiently differentiated 
section” as a relevant market.114  The DOJ could use its ability to easily define a market to 
challenge many mergers. This is because if the DOJ wanted to prove that a merger would create 
anti-competitive effects, it could simply adjust the “relevant market” size until the market share 
percentages support their argument. In this way, being able to easily define the “relevant market” 
was an important regulatory tool for the DOJ.  
 After Marine Bancoropration and Connecticut, the DOJ could no longer establish a 
relevant market with Pabst ease. Instead, these cases affirmed that the DOJ could only use a 
relevant market that was no larger than the area in which the acquired firm was actually 
competing. It placed the burden on the government to prove that their provided market did 
capture the true scope of the competition.115 Thus, the DOJ had to spend much more of its 
resources on producing the economic evidence necessary to prove its relevant markets were 
actually relevant. Using Seinfeld’s purposive process as described in Part 1, this increased cost of  
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challenging mergers likely deterred the DOJ from pursuing as many antitrust cases as it 
previously had. By taking away the ability of the DOJ to easily establish a relative market, the 
Supreme Court provided the DOJ another regulatory roadblock in its effort to achieve its goal of 
protecting market shares.  
C. Geographic Expansion Model 3: Special Arrangements 
 Because branching, merger, and acquisition policies were still too strict in some states for 
banks to expand, banks and bank holding companies began to use  “special arrangements” for 
expansion. These arrangements typically involved multiple banks working with each other to act 
like one bank. This gave banks multiple benefits. First, banks could get around strict state and 
national regulations that restricted their ability to gain a diversified portfolio. Second, banks 
could use these special arrangements to eliminate competitors and to collectively set interest 
rates among banks in the arrangement. Because of this seemingly collusive behavior, the DOJ 
sought to regulate special arrangements to protect market shares and consumers. In 1975, the 
DOJ challenged one of these special arrangements, and the Supreme Court heard the case. 
I. United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1975) 
 Citizens & Southern National (C&S) was a banking organization located in Georgia that 
owned C&S Holding Company, a bank holding company. Before 1971, Georgia law prohibited 
branching throughout counties. This prohibited a bank based in the city of Atlanta from 
branching into Atlanta suburbs. Georgia law also prohibited bank holding companies from 
owning more than 5% of shares of two or more banks in one county. C&S Holding Company 
owned over 90% of two banks, one in Fulton County and the other in DeKalb County. These are 
the two counties that encompass much of Atlanta and its suburbs. However, responding to strict 
state laws, C&S Holding Company developed a special arrangement with many other Atlanta 
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suburban banks. Throughout Fulton and DeKalb County, C&S would help organize a bank on 
paper and would then assist with the selling of that bank’s stock. At the sale of the stock, C&S 
Holding Company would buy 5% of the bank’s shares. I refer to these banks as 5% banks. Once 
these banks were operating, C&S Holding Company would afford them special privileges. This 
included use of the holding company’s logarithm for setting interest rates, the use of bank 
strategy, and the use of bank’s marketing and brand. These 5% banks would not compete with 
any other bank owned or partially owned by C&S Holding Company.116  
 This kind of special relationship is referred to as “De Facto Branching,” because in effect, 
the 5% banks acted as branches for C&S Holding Company. After 1971, Georgia changed their 
laws to allow banks to legally branch throughout their counties. In response to the changes, the 
two national banks that C&S Holding Company owned more than 90% of (one in DeKalb 
County and one in Fulton County) tried to purchase all of the stock in each of the 5% banks in 
their respective counties. The FDIC approved these mergers. 117 The proposed organization 
structure of the C&S banking system can be seen in Figure 9. The DOJ initially challenged the 
mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. As the case continued through the court system, the 
DOJ also challenged the de facto branching system that C&S had established.118 The DOJ 
challenged that the C&S Holding through its special arrangements was illegally engaging in trust 
activity under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.119  
 The Supreme Court, in an ideologically driven vote, sided with C&S National over the 
DOJ. The Court ruled that the other de facto branches were immune to the Sherman Act because 																																																								
116 United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, Complaint filed by the United States, 
422 U.S. 86, 13-19 (1975). 
117 Ibid, 13-19; and United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, Brief of the United 
States, 422 U.S. 86 (1975). 
118 ibid, 19-21 
119 15 U.S.C. §1	
	 64	
the lack of price competition between the de facto branches was the result of “sharing of 
expertise” and not “tacit agreements.”120 According to the Court, because Georgia branching and 
merging laws were so strict, these special arrangements were the only way banks could enter into 
new markets. The Court, finally, decided that the approved mergers did not violate Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act because the 5% banks would not extinguish present or potential competition 
because the banks had not previously been competing.121 
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a) Supreme Court Regulatory Impact on Special Arrangements 
 By establishing that de facto branches do not result in a violation of the Sherman Anti 
Trust Act, bank holding companies were given a new tool to get around strict state and national 
geographic expansion laws. It also allowed the Federal Reserve to approve de facto branch 
acquisitions by bank holding companies. Lastly, it allowed the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and the OCC to approve acquisitions of de facto branches by the national 
banks. This gave these national regulators a regulatory tool that they could use to achieve their 
goal of fostering bank expansion.  
i. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 While Citizens & Southern gave regulators with goals to deregulate bank expansion an 
easier path to do so, it roadblocked antitrust regulators from achieving their goals. By permitting 
de facto branching, the Court made it more difficult for the DOJ to use Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act to achieve their goal of curtailing market concentration 
and protecting consumers. This proved to be a robust regulatory roadblock for the DOJ. At the 
same time as Citizens & Southern, the DOJ was challenging another special arrangement in 
Michigan established by Michigan National Corporation.122 Shortly after the Supreme Court 
decisions, the DOJ put out a public notice that it settled with Michigan National. Michigan 
National agreed to divest its interest in one of their acquired de facto branches – one where it was 
abundantly clear there would be anti-competitive effects – in exchange that the DOJ drop their 
challenges of all other acquisitions by Michigan National. In its public notice about this 
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settlement, the DOJ admitted that, after Citizens Southern, there was a “substantially reduced 
likelihood” of winning its challenge.123  
 The Michigan National Corporation settlement works to prove the regulatory roadblock 
aspect of my inter-branch theory. The DOJ had a goal to protect competition. It historically had 
used Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act to block special 
arrangements between banks in order to block mergers that threatened competition. In Citizen & 
Southern, the Supreme Court inhibited the ability of the DOJ to use these antitrust statutes to 
block special arrangements that threatened competition. Because of this roadblock, the DOJ 
decided to drop its challenge and focus its resources on less roadblocked regulatory goals. Based 
on the DOJ’s public notice for its Michigan settlement, it is likely that the DOJ declined to 
pursue subsequent special arrangement cases after Citizens & Southern.   
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D. Geographic Expansion of Banking Conclusion 
 Throughout the cases presented in this section, the Supreme Court gave regulators with 
goals to foster geographic bank expansion the regulatory tools they needed to do so. By allowing 
federal regulators such as the OCC to preempt states in defining branching, the Supreme Court 
gave these regulators the ability to construe the definition of branching in a manner that 
permitted banks to expand in ways that had previously been deemed illegal in many states.124 
Similarly, by restricting the use of the potential competition doctrine for bank merger challenges, 
the Supreme Court gave federal regulators who wished to foster bank expansion the ability to 
approve bank mergers without fear of costly antitrust litigation.125 Finally, by legitimizing the 
use of de facto branches in states with strict branching laws, the Supreme Court allowed 
regulators to approve special arrangements established by banks.126  
 While the Supreme Court was providing these tools to regulatory agencies with goals of 
deregulating geographic expansion of banking, they were creating regulatory roadblocks for 
agencies with pro-regulatory goals. By allowing federal regulators to preempt state definitions of 
branching, the Supreme Court restricted state regulators who wished to maintain tight restrictions 
on bank expansions.127 Similarly, by allowing banks and bank holding companies to use mergers, 
acquisitions, and special arrangements to get around strict branching laws, the Court further 
restricted the ability of states to control bank expansion.128 Lastly, in taking away the efficacy of 
antitrust doctrines like potential competition and statutes like the Sherman Act and the Clayton 
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Act, the Supreme Court roadblocked antitrust regulators from maintaining control of geographic 
bank expansion. 
 By continuously providing regulators with deregulatory goals with tools to accomplish 
their goals, the Supreme Court encouraged these regulators to continue to deregulate restrictions 
on bank expansion. At the same time, by continuously road blocking regulators with goals to 
maintain regulations on bank expansions, the Court encouraged these regulators to focus their 
limited resources on other goals. Over time, this helped lead to an overall trend of deregulation 
of bank expansion policies. Within 25 years of these Supreme Court cases, all national banks 
were allowed to expand throughout the country.129  
 
Part 5: Case Study 3 – Repeal of Glass-Steagall  
 Glass-Steagall was legislation born in the midst of the Great Depression that banned 
commercial banks from engaging in most insurance or securities transactions.130 Many policy 
makers during the Great Depression believed that commercial banks underwriting stocks and 
bonds contributed to over-speculation in the stock market and the resulting wave of bank 
failures.131 Glass-Steagall separated commercial banks from financial institutions concentrating 
on securities transactions such as brokerage firms or investments banks. However, as discussed 
in Part 2, when commercial bank profits began to struggle due to the high inflation in the 1970s, 
commercial banks began to look for alternative sources of revenue.  
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 At the same time that commercial banking profits were reeling, financial innovations in 
the securities markets led to roaring profits for investment banks. The rise of money market 
funds (MMFs) led to a large supply of loanable funds that could be used in the short-term debt 
market.132 This led to the growth of the commercial paper market. Commercial paper is a short-
term unsecured promise to pay later that highly credible companies use to finance their short-
term needs. Before commercial paper, these highly credible companies would use commercial 
banks to finance their short-term needs. However, because of Glass-Steagall provisions, 
commercial banks could not underwrite and sell commercial paper for companies. Therefore, 
large companies that used to borrow from commercial banks to finance their needs now turned to 
investment banks. Thus, as commercial banks lost profits with high inflation, a loss of depositors 
to mutual money funds, and a loss of borrowers to the commercial paper market, commercial 
banks began to see the value in having securities arms that could perform securities transactions 
such as underwriting and selling commercial paper.  
 A second securities market innovation that led to higher profits for securities dealers was 
the growth of private-label securitization. Private label securitization allowed securities dealers 
to pool bundles of loans and securities together and sell stock of these bundles to investors. 
Investors began to pour cash into various private-label securitization vehicles.133 Seeing large 
profits in these securities activities, commercial banks were eager to profit off of private label 
securitization as well.134 Throughout the 1970s and through the 1990s, banks and their federal 
regulators fought in many legal battles to allow banks to engage in securities transactions. 
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Though the Supreme Court did strike down some bank actions and bank policies135, its decisions 
in the two cases presented in this section ultimately laid the groundwork for the official repeal of 
Glass-Steagall in 1999.136  
A. Board of Governors FRS v. Investment Co. Institute (1981) 
 In 1972, the Federal Reserve issued a ruling amending Regulation Y – the rule stating 
what activities bank holding companies could engage in – allowing holding companies to 
establish investment advisory arms that could help establish and run closed-end investment-
companies.137 A closed-end investment company does not allow shareholders to redeem their 
shares for cash and cannot issue new shares at frequent intervals after the company is 
established. This is in contrast to an open-end investment company, such as an ETF or a mutual 
fund, which issues new shares quite often and allows shareholders to redeem their shares for 
cash. The closed-end “investment companies” that the Federal Reserve approved banks to advise 
were only companies on paper. The bank holding company advisory arm would establish a 
closed-end company without an office or employees. Then, the advisory arm would hand the 
company to an investment company to create and sell shares of the fund. Finally, once all of the 
shares were sold, the advisory arm would run the portfolio of the investment company as its 
“advisor.”138 
 In its ruling, the Federal Reserve relied on Section 4(C)(8) of the Bank Holding Company 
Act (BHCA), which authorized the Board to allow bank holding companies to establish non-
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banking activity arms that were “so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks 
as to be a proper incident thereto”139 Many securities dealers, fearing that commercial banks 
would be added competition in their markets, fought back against the Federal Reserve ruling. 
These securities dealers feared that allowing commercial banks to engage in securities markets 
would add more competition to their markets. The Investment Company institute, a securities 
dealer lobbying organization, argued that the Federal Reserve overstepped its authority in their 
ruling. The Glass-Steagall Act restricted the participation of banks and their affiliates in specific 
securities industries. So the Investment Company Institute challenged the rule, and the challenge 
eventually made it to the Supreme Court.  
 The central question of the case was whether Section 4(C)(8) of the BHCA authorized 
Bank Holding Companies to establish investment advisory companies and manage these 
companies’ portfolios. Investment Company Institute argued that the Fed’s rulings violated 
Glass-Steagall because they engaged in securities activities by sponsoring the closed-end 
investment company. The Investment Company Institute continued that the BHCA does not 
permit a departure from pertinent Glass-Steagall prohibitions, even if an activity is close to 
banking.140 The Federal Reserve argued that it were justified in their ruling because the 
organization and management of a closed-end investment fund was permissible activity under 
the Glass-Steagall Act. The Fed argued that they were not engaged principally in the issuance 
and marketing of the securities, and therefore were not in violation of Glass-Steagall 
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prohibitions. The Fed also argued that its decision was entitled to judicial deference with regards 
to deciding what non-banking activities were allowed.141  
 Ultimately, the Supreme Court unanimously sided with the Fed. The Court said that its 
amendment to Regulation Y did not exceed the Board’s statutory authority. In his opinion, 
Justice Stevens included many details that would later be used by banking regulators to justify 
further deregulation. Justice Stevens noted that bank affiliates might be authorized to engage in 
activities that banks themselves are prohibited from engaging in.142 In particular, Stevens 
stressed this was true if the benefits the affiliates could be expected to produce in engaging in 
these activities outweighed possible adverse effects of their securities activities.143 Further, 
Stevens affirmed that the Board should be granted “greatest deference” with regard to their 
decision-making on non-banking activities to be permitted.144 
I. Regulatory Impact 
 The relevant regulatory agencies with goals to integrate securities activities and 
commercial banking were the agencies that were in charge of approving banks and bank holding 
companies to acquire new investment arms. These regulators included the Federal Reserve, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Housing Finance Board. Using the 
research presented below, it appears that all of these agencies had the regulatory goal to allow 
banks, thrifts, and bank holding companies to expand their array of allowable activities. This 
makes sense based off the relevant goals presented in Part 2. The Federal Reserve, particularly 
under Alan Greenspan, was concerned with bank profitability and deregulating the financial 
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industry. The Federal Housing Finance Board was concerned with thrifts remaining chartered as 
thrifts and not commercial banks. Lastly, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was trying 
to keep its insured institutions profitable in order to protect its insurance fund. These goals drove 
these agencies to respond to Investment Company Institute by using tools derived from the Court 
case to wither way at Glass-Steagall prohibitions. 
 At the same time these agencies were removing Glass-Steagall provisions, it appears that 
no agencies were overly concerned with trying to fight Glass-Steagall provisions. I could not 
find evidence of any agency taking major enforcement or rule-making actions to stop the gradual 
deregulation of Glass-Steagall that is outlined below. Because there was no regulatory agency 
trying to stop the gradual repeal of Glass-Steagall, it is possible that this allowed its repeal to be 
an extremely effective deregulatory trend. 
a) Federal Reserve 
 The Federal Reserve made quick use of its new tool, “greatest deference,” which the 
Supreme Court bestowed on the agency. In November of 1981, the Fed permitted bank holding 
companies to use traveler’s checks, something that had previously not been explicitly 
permitted.145 The Federal Reserve defended its ruling by arguing “the court said ‘the Board’s 
determination of what activities are closely related to banking is entitled to the greatest 
deference.’”146 Though this was not a securities activity, it was the first time the Fed used its 
“greatest deference” to expand the activities banks could engage in. Three years later, the Federal 
Reserve again used its greatest deference to allow five new non-banking activities: issuing of 
money orders, commercial real estate equity financing, underwriting dealings in government 
obligations, foreign exchange advisory and transaction services, and future commission 																																																								
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services.147 In allowing these services, many of which involved securities transactions, the Board 
cited that it believes the benefits of these non-banking services outweigh the potential harms.148 
Further, in 1986, the Federal Reserve permitted Bankers Trust to sell commercial paper on behalf 
of its clients. This ruling was challenged and the case was brought to the District Court, which 
affirmed that the Federal Reserve was allowed to approve the matter because of its “greatest 
deference.”149 
 The Federal Reserve Chairman at the time of these rulings was Paul Volcker. As 
chairman, Volcker came in at the height of stagflation. As banks and bank holding companies 
were struggling for profits, Volcker and his board appeared to take the tools bestowed to them by 
the Supreme Court and used them to help Bank Holding Companies expand their services to 
increase profitability. After Investment Company Institute, Volcker and the Federal Reserve used 
the tool of “greatest deference” that was given to them and pushed towards deregulation of the 
prohibitions between banking and securities activities.  
 After Volcker was replaced with Alan Greenspan, Greenspan continued to use his 
agency’s greatest deference tool to deregulate Glass-Steagall provisions. In 1988, the Federal 
Reserve successfully argued to the Washington D.C. Circuit Court that it could allow banks to 
own 5% of their investment portfolio in “bank ineligible” securities such as private label 
securities, assets backed by consumer loans, and ineligible commercial paper.150 The Court 
justified its decision by saying that the Board was granted greatest deference by the Supreme 
Court. That same year, the Fed issued another ruling that allowed the Fed to permit banks to 
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engage in various types of debt and equity securities transactions. Again, the Court reasoned its 
ruling by citing the “greatest deference” that the Supreme Court afforded the Fed in its 
decisions.151 From Investment Company Institute in 1981 through 1988, the Federal Reserve used 
the tool of “greatest deference” to permit commercial banks to engage in various kinds of 
complex security transactions.    
b)  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
 The Supreme Court affirmed through Investment Company Institute that banks that were 
members of the Federal Reserve System could establish affiliates that advised investment funds. 
However, the question still remained as to whether non-Federal Reserve member banks could 
establish such advisory arms. In 1982, the FDIC further extended the ability to establish advisory 
affiliates to non-member banks that were insured by the FDIC. The FDIC justified this extension 
by arguing that the Supreme Court in Investment Company Institute affirmed that the section of 
Glass-Steagall that prohibits securities activities only applies to banks and not their affiliates. 
The FDIC reasoned that this affiliate protection from Glass-Steagall should apply to all banks, 
not just Federal Reserve member banks.152  In 1984, the FDIC acknowledged in a final rule that 
there might be some inherent risk in allowing banks to engage in securities activities. However, 
the FDIC affirmed that the Supreme Court ruling makes it clear that it is legal for an affiliate of 
the bank to engage in securities activities.153 In these cases, the FDIC is taking the protections 
that the Supreme Court afforded Federal Reserve member banks and it extended them to all 
federally insured banks as well.  
c) Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) 																																																								
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 By 1998, the Federal Housing Finance Board was the new agency in charge of thrifts 
after the Savings and Loans Crisis of the 1980s caused the collapse of the Federal Home Loans 
Bank Board in 1990. Thrifts at this time were eager to diversify their portfolios outside of the 
housing market. In 1998, the FHFB issued a ruling that eliminated the requirement that 50% of 
the value of thrifts’ assets had to be attributable to their residential portfolio.154 The FHFB 
argued that it had the jurisdiction to enact this rule because of the deference that the Supreme 
Court provided to agencies in the financial services industry. Specifically, the FHFB cited 
Investment Company Institute.155 In this ruling, the FHFB took the greatest deference that the 
Supreme Court bestowed onto the Federal Reserve, generalized it to all financial services 
agencies, and used it to further their agency’s own deregulatory goals. Though this FHFB ruling 
did not involve a repeal of Glass-Steagall provisions, it was very important to the deregulation of 
the thrift industry.  This ruling was particularly important because the deregulation of the thrift 
industry and its residential portfolio requirements was a major contributor to the savings and 
loans crisis of the 1980s.156 By allowing thrifts to engage in even broader loans, the FHFB was 
inviting thrifts to take on the same kind of risky loans that brought their industry down in the 
1980s.  
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B. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors FRS (1984) 
 Shortly after Investment Company Institute gave broad discretion to the Federal Reserve 
to determine what non-banking activities commercial banks could engage in, the Federal Reserve 
approved BankAmerica Corporation to acquire Charles Schwab & Co. The Fed permitted a Bank 
Holding Company to purchase a discount brokerage firm for the first time since the enactment of 
Glass-Steagall.157 Shortly after this purchase, Security Industry Association, a group of securities 
dealers, challenged the Board’s approval of the acquisition. The Federal Reserve defended its 
decision by arguing that discount brokerage services were “closely related to banking” within the 
meaning of the Bank Holding Company Act, and therefore were a justified activity for a holding 
company to engage in. Though banks had not undertaken discount brokerage for half of a 
century, the Board argued that it was closely related to banking due to its “functional similarity” 
to current activities being undertaken in commercial bank trust departments.158 Further, the 
Federal Reserve argued that the Glass-Steagall Act did not prohibit these activities because 
security brokerage does not involve the underwriting or promoting of securities.  
 The Supreme Court unanimously sided with the Federal Reserve, affirming that the 
Board does have the authority to approve BankAmerica to acquire a nonbanking affiliate 
engaged principally in retail securities brokerage. The Court said that brokerage activities were 
consistent with 4(C)(8) as closely related to banking.159 The Court said that the determination 
was reasonable and affirmed that the Board had greatest deference in these decisions. One 
important nuance in the opinion was that the Court affirmed that it was okay for the Board to rely 																																																								
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on “its own banking expertise” to justify the approval of nonbanking activities.160 The Court 
went as far to say that the Board could consider any reasonable basis for finding that an activity 
is “closely related” to banking. By giving this authority to the Board, the Supreme Court invited 
the Board to justify additional permitted nonbanking activities through their “expertise.” 
I. Regulatory Impact 
a) Federal Reserve 
 Shortly after the case, the Federal Reserve issued a final rule expanding the list of 
nonbanking activities again. In this case, it expanded the list to include personal property 
appraisals, commodity trading and futures commission merchant advice, consumer financial 
counseling, tax preparation and planning, check guaranty services, operating a collection agency, 
and operating a credit bureau.161 In this rule, the Federal Reserve asserted, “the courts have made 
it clear… that the Act grants the Broad discretion to consider any criteria which provide a 
reasonable basis for a finding that a particular nonbanking activity has close relationship to 
banking.”162 The Federal Reserve argued that it derived their authority to drastically expand the 
list of acceptable banking activities because of their “expertise.”  
 In 1992, the Federal Reserve allowed commercial banks to act as agents for customers in 
the brokerage of shares of an investment company that the bank holding company advises.163 In 
other words, a subsidiary of a bank holding company could sell to a customer a share of a 
company that was managed by that bank holding company. In effect, this act allowed bank 
holding companies to sell their own closed-end funds to their customers. This brought forward 
serious conflict of interest issues, as brokers of a bank holding company would be incentivized to 																																																								
160 ibid, at 211 
161 51 FR 39994 (November 4, 1986) 
162 ibid, at 206	
163 57 FR 0387 (July 9, 1992) 
	 81	
sell their clients shares of subsidiaries of their own company over shares of companies that could 
offer higher returns. This type of securities transaction would likely be in violation of the Glass-
Steagall Act as it was written, and it encompassed the kind of conflicts of interest that the 
legislation attempted to curtail. However, the Federal Reserve justified their ruling by saying that 
the Supreme Court affirmed in Security Industry Association that banks can serve in brokerage 
functions.   
b) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 The SEC oversees the major United States stock exchanges. The SEC has a goal to 
promote more competition and lower prices in these stock exchanges. Thus, the SEC used the 
Supreme Court ruling to increase the allowable participants in their exchanges. In 1988, the SEC 
amended its oversight of the Midwest Stock Exchange (what is today the Chicago Stock 
Exchange) to allow affiliates of banks or bank holding companies to become Exchange 
members.164 The Board of the SEC made this change as BankAmerica, Chase, and Continental 
Illinois each obtained ownership or was bought out by commission-registered brokers. The 
Board justified this by pointing to Securities Industry Association’s ruling that brokerage was 
functionally similar to commercial banking. This extended Securities Industry Association 
further by allowing commercial banks to become integrated into the brokerage securities 
business. This case allowed commercial banks to enter into the exchanges that had brought 
commercial banks trouble in the buildup to the Great Depression. In this case, the SEC used the 
Court ruling that brokerage was functionally similar to banking in order to permit bank affiliates 
on the exchange and foster more competition in one of their prominent securities exchanges.  
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C. Gramm-Leach Bliley Act 
 After years of agencies using Security Industry Association and Investment Company 
Institute to integrate commercial banking and securities activities, Congress officially repealed 
the Glass-Steagall Act through the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.165 This Act is 
more popularly known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The impact that these two cases had on 
the act can be seen through the Congressional Reports and hearings that led up to the Act.  
 Shortly after Investment Company Institute, many bank lobbyists appeared in front of 
Congress lobbying for a statutory repeal of Glass-Steagall by pointing to the Supreme Court 
decisions. Lobbyists pointed out that the Court had affirmed a “significantly less stringent 
standard” in allowing banks to participate in securities activities.166 In 1983, the United States 
House held a series of hearings it later titled “Confusion in the Legal Framework of the 
American Financial System and Service Industry.”167 Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on 
Government Operations Doug Barnard opened the hearings with the following statement: 
“The subcommittee begins today a series of hearings on one of the 
most difficult and pressing issues facing the Congress – the 
growing confusion in the legal framework of the American 
financial system and service industry. We live increasingly in a 
world of financial hybrids, outside the traditional divisions of 
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banks, savings and loans, mutual savings banks, insurance 
companies, real estate concerns, brokerages, and so on.”168 
 As regulators continued to use their “greatest deference” to blur the distinctions between 
banks and other financial services, Congress became increasingly worried about the confusion 
that was being fostered by both consumers and those within the industry. Lobbyists and 
regulators began to push the notion that the confusion that has arisen in the industry can be 
solved with a repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. The General Counsel of the SEC noted in his 
hearing that a way to combat this confusion was an overall and unambiguous repeal of Glass-
Steagall.169 Regulators pushing the narrative that a way to address general confusion is a total 
repeal is particularly interesting because it was often the regulators who were fostering confusion 
through using their use of “greatest deference” to approve additional nonbanking activities.  
 Rather than considering that the confusion could be addressed by strengthening the 
distinction between banking and securities activities, lobbyists, bankers, and agencies continued 
to argue that the confusion should be addressed by completely removing the distinction between 
financial service organizations. In a House Report for the Financial Institution Equity Act of 
1984, an unsuccessful bill that would have re-strengthened Glass-Steagall provisions, libertarian 
Ron Paul pointed to Security Industry Association to show that the lines between financial 
services were being blurred. Paul used this to successfully argue against strengthening 
regulations.170 By allowing agencies to break down the barriers of the Glass-Steagall provisions, 
the Supreme Court put Congress in a position where officially repealing Glass-Steagall was a 
natural step.   																																																								
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  By 1997, regulators continued to blur the lines of banking and securities activities 
through using “Greatest Deference” and “Expertise.” The House Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit held a hearing in 1997 to discuss a bill, which would serve as a 
precursor to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, to repeal Glass-Steagall.171 In her opening statement 
of the hearings, Chairwomen Roukema reflected the era’s contemporary view of Glass-Steagall, 
“Clearly, it is time to reform the Glass-Steagall.”172 Through the hearings it became clear that 
years of agencies using their deference to blur Glass-Steagall provisions had led to the sentiment 
reflected in the Chairwoman’s statement. Congresswoman Maloney told the rest of the 
Committee that the result of the OCC allowing certain securities activities is “confusion and 
guesswork where there should be clarity and certainty.”173 A letter from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission prepared for the hearings commended the bill for dealing with the 
customer confusion that has been caused as a result of the integration of banking and securities 
transactions.174  
 The Supreme Court, although indirectly, did have an impact on the ultimate repeal of 
Glass-Steagall. As discussed in this section, the Supreme Court helped regulators use their 
“deference” to integrate banking and securities activates. These hearings show that Congress was 
concerned with the blurring of Glass-Steagall distinctions when they repealed the act. Thus, 
through providing regulators with tools like “greatest deference” and “expertise,” the Supreme 
Court helped foster the agency behavior that led to the ultimate repeal of Glass-Steagall 
restrictions on banking and investment banking.  
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D. Repeal of Glass-Steagall Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court had a significant impact on the gradual breakdown and eventual 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the integration of banking and nonbanking activities. The 
Supreme Court gave regulators with goals to increase the profitability of commercial banks the 
tool of “greatest deference” and  “expertise.” These tools allowed the agencies to use their 
deference and expertise to make justifications for continuing to repeal Glass-Steagall provisions. 
By removing these provisions, regulators allowed commercial banks to engage in activities that 
were more profitable than traditional commercial bankin.. After the Supreme Court helped 
regulators to blur the line between commercial banking and other securities activities, lobbyists 
and lawmakers pressed forward with the ultimate statutory repeal of Glass-Steagall. In effect, the 
Supreme Court helped drive the deregulation of Glass-Steagall provisions until the entire act was 
ultimately repealed in 1999. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Burger Court altered the course of banking regulation through providing regulatory 
tools and roadblocks to banking regulatory agencies. The Burger Court consistently provided 
agencies with goals to remove regulations on banks with the tools they need to do so. At the 
same time, the Supreme Court consistently provided regulatory roadblocks to agencies with 
goals to increase or maintain tight regulations on banks. Over time, this allowed for the 
deregulatory goals of some agencies to override the pro-regulatory goals of other agencies.  
 This trend could be seen through all three case studies presented in this thesis. Federal 
agencies with goals to reduce interest rate caps on bank loans were given the tool of federal 
preemption. This allowed federal regulators to overrule states with strict usury interest rate laws. 
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At the same time, this federal preemption served as a regulatory roadblock for state agencies 
with goals to protect their borrowers from high interest rates on their loans. Over time, the tool 
and roadblock of federal preemption led to the reduction and removal of most interest rate 
restrictions on bank loans. Thus, the Supreme Court helped drive banking regulation towards 
deregulated loan caps. 
 The case study on the geographic expansion of banking also encompassed the 
deregulatory goals of some agencies overriding the pro-regulatory goals of other agencies. By 
allowing federal regulators to define branching, the Supreme Court provided these regulators 
with a tool to achieve their goal of bank expansion. At the same time, by taking away the ability 
to define branching from the states, the Supreme Court roadblock state regulators who sought to 
limit bank expansion through strict branching laws.  
 Further, by weakening the efficacy of antitrust litigation tactics for challenging bank 
mergers, the Supreme Court roadblocked agencies with goals to restrict bank expansion. At the 
same time, this provided agencies with goals to increase bank expansion an easier path to do so, 
as these regulators could approve bank mergers and acquisitions without fear of costly antitrust 
challenges. Relatedly, by allowing banks and bank holding companies to circumvent state 
branching laws through mergers, acquisitions, and special arrangements, the Supreme Court 
roadblocked state agencies who wanted to limit bank expansion. Through consistently providing 
tools to bank regulators with goals to deregulate bank expansion restrictions, and consistently 
providing roadblocks to bank regulators with goals to maintain bank expansion restrictions, the 
Supreme Court helped facilitate the deregulation of restrictions on bank expansion.  
 Lastly, the Supreme Court allowed regulators to repeal Glass-Steagall provisions by 
providing the Fed with the tools of “Greatest Deference” and “Expertise” to use when 
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determining what activities would be permitted by banks and bank holding companies. By 
providing these tools, the Supreme Court accelerated the regulator-induced integration of 
commercial banking and securities activities. Eventually, the confusion caused by this 
integration helped lead to the statutory repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
During the Burger Court era, there were many forces driving government agencies 
towards deregulation; a general ideological trend towards free markets, advanced lobbying by 
those in the industry, and financial innovations all surely played a role in government agencies 
deregulating banks. However, my research suggests that the Supreme Court at the very least 
accelerated deregulation by providing tools and roadblocks to differing agencies based on their 
goals. In particular, the geographic expansion of banks and the integration of banking and 
securities activities led banks to become much larger, much more integrated with each other and 
the broader financial system, and much riskier. As banks grew in size and scope, banks were able 
to take on more and more risks as the federal government continued to subside their risks 
through deposit insurance and too-big-to-fail policies.  
As the Court accelerated agencies in their deregulation of the banking industry, often 
times no actor or agency ensured that the system remained structurally sound under 
deregulation.175  For example, as the Court allowed regulators to permit commercial banks to 
engage in securities transactions, regulators did not adequately equip commercial banks with the 
capital requirements necessary to absorb the large losses that could come with risky securities 
deals.176 By accelerating banking deregulation, the Supreme Court helped foster a risky and 
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fragile banking environment leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. My thesis highlights the role 
that the Supreme played in these banking conditions.  
 Through this thesis, I have sought to prove the regulatory tool and roadblock theory of 
the judicial-agency relationship. This thesis proves that the regulatory tool and roadblock theory 
can be extended to banking regulatory agencies. Thus, this provides motivation for two future 
applications of my research. First, the regulatory tool and roadblock theory should be used to 
analyze current bank regulatory conditions. Through applying this framework to Roberts Court 
decisions and contemporary banking regulatory agencies, scholars should be able to predict more 
accurately the regulatory impact the current Court may have on future banking policies. This will 
allow scholars to understand the macro-regulatory impact that the Roberts Court may have on the 
banking system as a whole.  
 Second, the regulatory tool and roadblock theory should be tested in other regulatory 
policy areas outside of banking. Because of the differences between economic regulators and 
other regulators discussed in Part 2, it would make sense to begin this extension through other 
areas of economic and market regulation. If the findings in this thesis can be extended to the 
other areas of regulation, the regulatory tool and roadblock theory can lay the groundwork for a 
new understanding of the judicial-agency relationship. 
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Figure 14: The Impact of Tools and Roadblocks  Case	Study	 Tools	 Roadblocks	 Impact	Interest	Rate	Maximums	 Federal	Preemption	for	federal	regulators	with	goals	to	increase	bank	profitability.	
Federal	
Preemption	for	state	regulators	with	goals	to	protect	borrowers	from	usury.	
Reduction	and	removal	of	interest	rate	restrictions	on	bank	loans.		
Geographic	Expansion	of	Banking	–	Branching		
Defining	
Branching	for	federal	regulators	with	goals	to	increase	bank	expansion	
Cannot	define	
branching	for	state	regulators	with	goals	to	restrict	bank	expansion.	
Removal	of	state	restrictions	on	bank	expansion.	
Geographic	Expansion	of	Banking	–	Mergers	and	Acquisitions	/	Special	Arrangements	
Less	fear	of	
potential	
competition	
doctrine,	Section	
1,	or	Section	7	
antitrust	
challenges	for	regulators	with	goals	to	promote	bank	expansion.	
Weakened	
litigation	tools	for	antitrust	regulators	with	goals	to	protect	market	shares.		
Weaken	efficacy	
of	state	branching	
laws	for	state	regulators	with	goals	to	limit	bank	expansion.	
Removal	of	state	restrictions	on	bank	expansion.	
Repeal	of	Glass	Steagall	 “Greatest	Deference”	and	
“Expertise”	for	regulators	with	goals	to	remove	Glass-Steagall	provisions.		
N/A	 As	no	observed	regulators	fought	back	on	the	deregulation	of	Glass-Steagall,	the	prohibitory	provisions	of	the	act	were	gradually	reduced.	
 
